voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2018-1-71-90voprecotest-370Research ArticleРЕГИОНАЛЬНАЯ ЭКОНОМИКАREGIONAL ECONOMYДоходы, гранты и фискальные стимулы: оценка и причины эффектов децентрализации бюджетной системы РФRevenues, grants, and fiscal incentives-evaluation and the causes of decentralization effectsin the budgetary system of RussiaТимушевЕ. Н.TimushevE. N.

м. н. с. лаборатории финансово-экономических проблем Института социально-экономических и энергетических проблем Севера Коми научного центра Уральского отделения Российской академии наук (Сыктывкар, Республика Коми)

timushev@iespn.komisc.ruИнститут социально-экономических и энергетических проблем Севера Коми научного центра Уральского отделения Российской академии наукРоссияInstitute for Socio-Economic and Power Problems of the North, Komi Scientific Center, Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of SciencesRussian Federation201820012018017190Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20182018Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/370

В статье анализируются фискальные стимулы на уровне бюджетов субъектов РФ, создаваемые при предоставлении нецелевых федеральных грантов. Расчеты за 2005-2015 гг. показали отсутствие «эффекта липучки», при котором такие гранты повышают локальные общественные расходы на величину больше аналогичных частных вложений. Федеральный грант даже способствует понижению совокупных расходов бюджетов субъектов РФ, порождая негативный фискальный стимул и потерю благосостояния, демонстрируя отрицательный эффект межбюджетных отношений в текущем устройстве бюджетной системы РФ. В зависимости от параметров оценки эффект липучки выявлен для бюджетов субъектов Южного и Северокавказского федеральных округов, отсутствовал в Северо-Западном, Уральском и Дальневосточном федеральных округах. Вертикальная несбалансированность и использование дотаций на сбалансированность исключены как предполагаемые факторы появления эффекта липучки. Подтверждено влияние неэластичности расходов бюджета-получателя и косвенного налогообложения на возникновение эффекта.

The concept of the flypaper effect is used in analyzing fiscal incentives of the budgets of subjects of the Russian Federation receiving non-earmarked federal grants. The calculations for 2005-2015 revealed an absence of the flypaper effect in general. A federal grant produces downward pressure even on aggregate spending of a recipient budget, reflecting negative fiscal stimulus and loss of well-being, and demonstrating the negative effect of intergovern_mental relations in the current arrangement of the budgetary system of Russia. Depending on the evaluation parameters, the flypaper effect was identified in the budgets of the subjects of the South and North-Caucasian federal districts and was absent in North-West, Ural and Far East districts. Vertical imbalance and the use of discretionary balancing grants are ruled out as factors of the flypaper effect. At the same time, the effect of inelasticity of budget expenditures and indirect taxation are confirmed to generate the flypaper effect.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.