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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">voprecotest</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вопросы экономики</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Voprosy Ekonomiki</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">0042-8736</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.32609/0042-8736-2017-11-93-110</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">voprecotest-360</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ISSUES OF THEORY</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Контрактные основы российской экономики: сфера государственного, муниципального и регулируемого заказа</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Contract institutions in the Russian economy: The sphere of state, municipal, and regulated procurement</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Анчишкина</surname><given-names>О. В.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Anchishkina</surname><given-names>O.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>к.  э.  н., руководитель направления по развитию контрактной системы Фонда «Центр стратегических разработок» (Москва)</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">anchishkina@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Фонд «Центр стратегических разработок»</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Fund “Center for Strategic Research”</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2017</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>20</day><month>11</month><year>2017</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>11</issue><fpage>93</fpage><lpage>110</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 2017</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2017</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><license xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/360">https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/360</self-uri><abstract><p>В статье обобщены результаты эмпирических исследований сектора государственных, муниципальных и регулируемых закупок. Выявлен и объяснен феномен фундаментальной нестабильности количественных показателей контрактных отношений, статистически доказана гетерогенная структура контрактной системы с доминированием крупных игроков и дано ее описание. Предложены исходные модели контрактных взаимодействий, что позволило объяснить ведущие тенденции в сфере закупок. В действующей модели контрактных отношений обнаружены и раскрыты встроенные недостатки. Однако дефектность этих отношений понимается не как ограничение, а как задача, решение которой станет драйвером роста и создаст потенциал развития контрактных основ российской экономики.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The article synthesizes information on database analysis of state, municipal, and regulated procurement through which Russian contract institutions and the market model are investigated. The inherent uncertainty of quantity indicators on contracting activities and process is identified and explained. The article provides statistical evidence for heterogeneous market structure in state and municipal procurement, and big player’s dominance. A theoretical model for market behavior, noncooperative competition and collusion is proposed, through which the major trends are explained. The intrinsic flaws and failure of the current contracting model are revealed and described. This ineffectiveness is regarded to be not a limitation, but a challenge to be met. If responded to, drivers for economic growth and market equilibrium will be switched on.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>контрактные отношения</kwd><kwd>контрактная система</kwd><kwd>контракт</kwd><kwd>госзаказ</kwd><kwd>заказчик</kwd><kwd>поставщик</kwd><kwd>модель рынка</kwd><kwd>доминирование</kwd><kwd>модель взаимодействия</kwd><kwd>аукцион</kwd><kwd>торги</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>contracts</kwd><kwd>contract law</kwd><kwd>national government expenditure</kwd><kwd>public goods</kwd><kwd>procurement entity</kwd><kwd>supplier</kwd><kwd>market structure</kwd><kwd>market behavior</kwd><kwd>competition</kwd><kwd>collusion</kwd><kwd>oligopolies</kwd><kwd>auction</kwd><kwd>noncooperative game theoretic model</kwd><kwd>information asymmetry</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Анчишкина О. В. (2014). 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