voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2017-11-63-92voprecotest-359Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORY1688 год и все такое: права собственности, Славная революция и подъем британского капитализма1688 and all that: Property rights, the Glorious Revolution and the rise of British capitalismХоджсонД. М.HodgsonG. M.

проф. Университета Хартфордшира (Великобритания)

g.m.hodgson@herts.ac.ukУниверситет ХартфордшираВеликобританияHertfordshire Business School, University of HertfordshireUnited Kingdom2017201120170116392Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20172017Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/359

Славная революция 1688 г. помогла обеспечить защиту прав собственности в Англии и стимулировать подъем капитализма. Д. Аджемоглу, С. Джонсон и Дж. Робинсон затем писали, что для английского Средневековья была характерна недостаточная защита прав собственности для землевладельцев, торговцев и первых промышленников, а укрепление прав собственности в конце XVII в. ускорило процесс финансовой и торговой экспансии. Однако такие рассуждения имеют недостатки. Права собственности в Англии были относительно защищены с XIII в. Главной проблемой была не защищенность прав, а их феодальный характер. Феодальные права на землю включали широко распространенные «майораты» и «строгие урегулирования». Революция 1688 г. не оказала заметного прямого влияния на состояние прав собственности. Но если учесть эту критику, то возникает вопрос о том, какие изменения содействовали росту капитализма. Приемлемый ответ можно найти, если обратиться к анализу финансовой и административной революций, которые произошли после 1688 г. в контексте необходимости воевать и усиления глобальных позиций Великобритании. Руководимая более влиятельным парламентом, полномочия которого росли, новая финансовая система стимулировала реформы прав собственности на землю, расширение состава имущества, используемого в качестве залога, и увеличение свободно торгуемых долгов. Именно эта новая финансовая система сделала возможной Промышленную революцию.

In a seminal 1989 article, Douglass North and Barry Weingast argued that by making the monarch more answerable to Parliament, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 helped to secure property rights in England and stimulate the rise of capitalism. Similarly, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson later wrote that in the English Middle Ages there was a “lack of property rights for landowners, merchants and proto-industrialists” and the “strengthening” of property rights in the late 17th century “spurred a process of financial and commercial expansion”. There are several problems with these arguments. Property rights in England were relatively secure from the 13th century. A major developmental problem was not the security of rights but their feudal nature, including widespread “entails” and “strict settlements”. 1688 had no obvious direct effect on property rights. Given these criticisms, what changes promoted the rise of capitalism? A more plausible answer is found by addressing the post-1688 Financial and Administrative Revolutions, which were pressured by the enhanced needs of war and Britain’s expanding global role. Guided by a more powerful Parliament, this new financial system stimulated reforms to landed property rights, the growth of collateralizable property and saleable debt, and thus enabled the Industrial Revolution.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.