voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2021-2-48-69voprecotest-3398Research ArticleБЮДЖЕТНО-НАЛОГОВАЯ ПОЛИТИКАFISCAL POLICYО долге российского государственного сектораOn Russia’s public sector debthttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-1579-3416БеляковИ. В.BelyakovI. V.

Беляков Игорь Вячеславович, кандидат физико-математических наук, руководитель направления «Финансовые рынки» ЭЭГ, старший научный сотрудник Центра бюджетного анализа и прогнозирования НИФИ

Москва

Igor V. Belyakov

Moscow

Igor.Belyakov@eeg.ruЭкономическая экспертная группа; Научно-исследовательский институт Минфина РоссииРоссияEconomic Expert Group; Financial Research Institute of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian FederationRussian Federation202107022021024869Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20212021Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/3398

В статье обсуждается проблема представления в официальной отчетности долга государственного сектора в широком определении. Рассматриваются инструментарий МВФ по оценке госдолга, особенности его практического использования и методологические аспекты долговой статистики. Даны оценки совокупных обязательств и ликвидных активов компонент российского госсектора. Отмечен рост с 2016 г. отношения совокупных обязательств крупнейших организаций с госконтролем к ВВП, прежде всего за счет увеличения доли госбанков в банковском секторе. Обоснована необходимость регулярного мониторинга и обзора обязательств и активов госсектора.

The article examines the problem of comprehensive official reporting on public sector debt. It considers the IMF toolkit for public debt statistics, the peculiarities of its practical use and inherent methodological issues influencing the quantitative assessments. Estimates of the total liabilities and liquid assets for the components of the Russian public sector are given, which show, inter alia, the increase of the total liabilities of the largest state-owned enterprises (as a share of GDP) since 2016, first of all, due to the growing share of stateowned banks in the banking sector. The importance of regular monitoring and review of the public sector liabilities and assets is substantiated.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.