voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2021-10-134-151voprecotest-3357Research ArticleЭКОНОМИКА ОТРАСЛЕВЫХ РЫНКОВINDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONЭкономический анализ границ фирмы и ограничений конкуренции: случай консорциума «Северный поток — 2»Economic analysis of the firm’s boundaries and the limits of competition: The case of Nord Stream 2 AGhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-0896-9217АвдашеваС. Б.AvdashevaS. B.

Авдашева Светлана Борисовна – доктор экономических наук, профессор факультета экономических наук НИУ ВШЭ.

Москва

Svetlana B. Avdasheva

Moscow

avdash@hse.ruhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-1322-0793ЮсуповаГ. Ф.YusupovaG. F.

Юсупова Гюзель Фатеховна - кандидат экономических наук, доцент факультета экономических наук НИУ ВШЭ.

Москва

Gyuzel F. Yusupova

Moscow

GYusupova@hse.ruНациональный исследовательский университет Высшая школа экономикиРоссияHSE UniversityRussian Federation202111102021010134151Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20212021Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/3357

Показана связь между обвинением польского антимонопольного органа UOKiK (Управление по конкуренции и защите потребителей) в отношении участников консорциума «Северный поток — 2» и представлениями о границах фирмы в современной институциональной экономике. Убедительность обвинения зависит от справедливости двух утверждений. Первое утверждение: совместное предприятие является фирмой (следовательно, создание совместного предприятия — сделка экономической концентрации, то есть слияния). В практике европейского антимонопольного законодательства различие совместных предприятий, которые признаются и не признаются слиянием, основано на концепции гибридных механизмов управления трансакциями. Второе утверждение: несмотря на принятые ПАО «Газпром» по решению Европейской комиссии обязательства и тренды развития европейского рынка газа, сохраняются возможности ценовой дискриминации. Обсуждение и оспаривание решений против ПАО «Газпром» свидетельствуют об актуальности институциональных исследований и экономики отраслевых рынков для разрешения правовых споров, возникающих при применении законодательства о конкуренции.

Using publicly available information, the article examines the economic concepts, which underlie the arguments of the decision of Polish competition authority UOKiK in relation to the participants of the Nord Stream 2. It explains the interrelation between economic and legal concepts, which are to be applied to interpret the competitive impact of joint venture and probable theory of harm for infrastructure investments under competition law of European Union, including in comparison with Russian competition law. It has been demonstrated that the resolution of a consortium case should be based on the proof of two statements. The first statement implies that the joint venture is a firm (and therefore the creation of a joint venture is a deal leading to economic concentration). The second statement means that despite Gazprom adopted the commitments about decision of the European Commission and trends in the development of the European gas market, the possibility of price discrimination is retained. Discussion and contestation of the decision against PJSC Gazprom testify in favor of maintaining the relevance of institutional studies and studies of industry markets for resolving legal disputes arising from the application of competition law.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.