voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2021-1-5-32voprecotest-3344Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORYОсновы теории аукционов (Нобелевская премия по экономике 2020 года)The principles of auction theory (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences 2020)https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1581-9951СонинК. И.SoninK. I.

Сонин Константин Исаакович, к. ф.-м. н., профессор Чикагского университета и НИУ ВШЭ Чикаго;

Москва

Konstantin I. Sonin

Chicago, IL;

Moscow

 

ksonin@gmail.comЧикагский университет; Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»Соединённые Штаты АмерикиUniversity of Chicago; HSE UniversityUnited States20211201202101532Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20212021Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/3344

Теория аукционов является ядром современной экономической теории, а стандартные аукционы — базовыми элементами множества моделей в микроэкономике, экономике общественного сектора и финансах. Теоретические исследования аукционов сформировали современное понимание экономической роли информации в работе конкурентного рынка и формировании рыночной цены. Прикладной анализ аукционов лег в основу важных практических механизмов — например, механизмов приватизации и ре-приватизации радиоспектра и государственных закупок. Нобелевская премия 2020 г., присужденная Роберту Уилсону и Полу Милгрому — это премия одновременно за вклад в создание основ теории аукционов и за разработку масштабных практических приложений.

Auction theory is the core of modern economic theory, and standard auctions are the basic elements of many models in microeconomics, public economics, and finance. Theoretical studies of auctions have shaped the modern understanding of the economic role of information in competitive market, and of price theory. Applied analysis of auctions has underpinned important practical mechanisms — for example, mechanisms of privatization and re-privatization of electromagnetic spectrum and public procurement. The 2020 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences was awarded to Robert Wilson and Paul Milgrom both for their contributions to the foundations of auction theory and for the development of largescale practical applications.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.