voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2021-9-109-131voprecotest-3307Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORYТипология агентских моделей коррупции и кейс тоталитарной коррупцииThe typology of agency models of corruption and the totalitarian corruption casehttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-6157-0283БерезинецИ. В.BeresinetsI. V.

Березинец Ирина Владимировна, к. ф.-м. н., доцент кафедры финансов и учета

Санкт-Петербург

Irina V. Beresinets

St. Petersburg

berezinets@gsom.spbu.ruhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-3952-1407ИвановА. Е.IvanovA. E.

Иванов Андрей Евгеньевич, к. ф.-м. н., доцент кафедры государственного и муниципального управления

Andrei E. Ivanov

St. Petersburg

ivanov@gsom.spbu.ruВысшая школа менеджмента Санкт-Петербургского государственного университетаРоссияGraduate School of Management of St. Petersburg University (St. PetersburgRussian FederationВысшая школа менеджмента Санкт-Петербургского государственного университетаРоссияGraduate School of Management of St. Petersburg UniversityRussian Federation20210309202109109131Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20212021Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/3307

Предлагается типология агентских моделей коррупции, основанная на соответствии предпочтений принципала и агента «идеальным» предпочтениям общества (базового принципала). Положенный в основу построения типологии подход позволил теоретически обосновать наличие новых моделей коррупционного поведения, получивших название квазии тоталитарной коррупции, а также продемонстрировать возможность их использования для описания поведения сторон в практике государственных закупок. В условиях неэффективного государственного регулирования добросовестные агенты, стремясь наилучшим образом удовлетворить потребности своих организаций и общества в целом, могут нарушать определенные положения нормативных правовых актов или принципов регуляторной политики (квазикоррупция), а недобросовестные агенты делают то же самое за взятки (эффективная коррупция). В некоторых случаях агенты вынуждены действовать в соответствии с неэффективным регулированием, будучи лишены возможности его нарушить (тоталитарная коррупция). На основе анализа практики закупок стационарных медицинских учреждений Санкт-Петербурга проверяется гипотеза о том, что положения российского регулирования закупок у единственного поставщика, ограничивающие ежегодный объем закупок ниже ценового порога, стимулируют использование электронных аукционов при их проведении. Обоснованы неэффективность такого рода регулирования и неспособность заказчика уклониться от него, сделан вывод о выполнении в рассматриваемом кейсе предпосылок модели тоталитарной коррупции.

The paper applies a typology of agency models of corruption, based on the conformity of principal and agent’s preferences to the “ideal” preferences of society. The proposed approach has allowed to theoretically substantiate the existence of new models of corrupt behavior, quasi- and totalitarian corruption, and subsequently to reveal cases of such agents’ behavior in the public procurement practice. In conditions of inefficient regulation, developed by the mala fide principal, bona fide agents in an effort to best meet the needs of society may violate certain provisions of regulatory legal acts or regulatory policy principles (quasi-corruption) whilst the mala fide agents do the same things for bribes (efficient corruption). On the other hand, in some cases the agents have to act in accordance with the inefficient regulation, being deprived of the possibility to violate it (totalitarian corruption). In the paper, the discussion of assumptions of different models, presented in the typology, including quasi- and totalitarian corruption, has been found in the academic literature. The paper examines the hypothesis that the proposition of Russian single-source procurement regulation which directly restricts annual small purchasing of contracting authorities provokes totalitarian corrupt behavior of buyers making them use electronic reverse auctions instead of single-source procurement to award small contracts.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.