voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2021-10-89-112voprecotest-3259Research ArticleФИНАНСОВАЯ ЭКОНОМИКАFINANCIAL ECONOMICSПремия за неявное страхование вкладов в российских государственных банкахPremium for implicit deposit insurance within Russian state bankshttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-2274-189XПеникасГ. И.PenikasH. I.

Пеникас Генрих Иозович - кандидат экономических наук, руководитель проектов Департамента исследований и прогнозирования Банка России, доцент департамента прикладной экономики факультета экономических наук НИУ ВШЭ, старший научный сотрудник лаборатории математического моделирования сложных систем ФИАН.

Москва

Henry I. Penikas

Moscow

penikas@hse.ruБанк России; Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики; Физический институт имени П. Н. Лебедева, РАНРоссияBank of Russia; HSE University; P. N. Lebedev Physics Institute, Russian Academy of SciencesRussian Federation20211010202101089112Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20212021Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/3259

Система страхования вкладов (ССВ) в России существует с 2003 г. При этом значимую долю рынка вкладов занимают государственные банки. Статус государственного ассоциируется у населения с повышенной сохранностью вкладов, даже на суммы сверх лимитов ССВ. Такое явление называют в литературе неявным страхованием вкладов. Предоставляя, по сути, услуги такого неявного страхования, государственные банки могли бы, при прочих равных, в теории предлагать меньшие ставки процента, чем частные банки по вкладам сверх лимитов ССВ. Используются данные из открытых источников для оценки платы за услугу неявного страхования в российских государственных банках. Показано, что государственные банки доплачивают за вклады сверх лимитов ССВ, причем в малых и крупных банках доплата существенно выше, чем в средних. Тем не менее общий уровень ставок в государственных банках ниже, чем в частных. Выявлено, что банки, использующие подход внутренних рейтингов, склонны устанавливать более высокие ставки по депозитам, если они берут на себя больше рисков, чем остальные банки.

Deposit insurance system (DIS) exists for 17 years in Russia. The major deposit market share belongs to state banks. Ordinary depositors may perceive the status of the bank state ownership to reflect additional deposit safety, even in the excess of the DIS limits. Such a situation is called an “implicit deposit insurance” in the literature. By offering a sort of implicit deposit insurance services state banks might underprice the deposits in excess of DIS limits compared to the private banks. We utilize data from the open sources to measure the scale of the implicit deposit insurance pricing in Russian state banks. We have revealed that Russian state banks pay extra premium all other things being equal. More specifically, the premium is larger in the smallest and the largest state banks, than in the medium-sized ones. Thus, we claim that the implicit insurance premium has a U-shaped form for Russian state banks depending on their asset size. However, Russian state banks underprice all deposits all other things being equal. Additionally, we find out that IRB banks in Russia are more prone to set up higher deposit rates when they take on more risks, than non-IRB banks.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.