voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2017-6-128-141voprecotest-316Research ArticleРАЗМЫШЛЕНИЯ НАД КНИГОЙREFLECTIONS ON THE BOOKЖан Тироль: политическая экономия корпоративных финансов (О книге Ж. Тироля «Теория корпоративных финансов»)Jean Tirole: The political economy of corporate finance (On the book by J. Tirole “The theory of corporate finance”)РанневаН. А.RannevaN.

к.  э.  н., старший научный сотрудник отдела экономической теории Национального исследовательского института мировой экономики и международных отношений имени Е.  М.  Примакова РАН (Москва)

nranneva@yandex.ruНациональный исследовательский институт мировой экономики и международных отношений имени Е. М. Примакова РАНРоссияPrimakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of SciencesRussian Federation20172006201706128141Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20172017Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/316

В статье анализируется значение книги Нобелевского лауреата 2014 г. Жана Тироля. Главное в новой работе Тироля - систематизация целой научной области с учетом достижений ее бурного развития на протяжении последних 30 лет. Максимально возможное упрощение методов моделиро- вания, использование унифицированного аналитического аппарата, новая интерпретация полученных ранее выводов и интересная структура книги обеспечили необходимую стройность изложения разнородного теоретического и эмпирического материала, накопленного за эти годы. Книга отражает син- тез новой институциональной экономической теории и традиционных иссле- дований корпоративных финансов. Это совершенно новый тип учебника, очень своевременного и необходимого для всех, кто изучает или интересуется микроэкономикой и корпоративными финансами.

The present article undertakes a critical review of the new book of Jean Tirole, the winner of the 2014 Nobel Prize in Economics, “The theory of cor- porate finance”, which has recently been published in Russian. The book makes a real contribution to the profession by summarizing the whole field of corporate finance and bringing together a big body of research developed over the last thirty years. By simplifying modeling, using unified analytical apparatus, undertaking reinterpretation of many previously received results, and structuring the material in original way Tirole achieves a necessary unity and simplicity in exposition of extremely heterogeneous theoretical and empirical material. The book integrates the new institutional economic theory into classical corporate finance theory and by doing so contributes to making a new type of textbook, which is quite on time and is likely to become essential reading for all graduate students in corporate finance and microeconomics and for everyone interested in these disciplines.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.