voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2017-6-58-70voprecotest-312Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORYВзаимодействие компаний на рынках взаимодополняемыхпо производству товаров (в контексте применения антимонопольного законодательства)Companies’ interaction in the markets of joint productsin the context of the antitrust law enforcementШаститкоА. А.ShastitkoA.

к. э.н., н.  с. Центра исследований конкуренции и экономического регулирования РАНХиГС (Москва), аспирант Новой школы социальных исследований (Нью-Йорк, США)

shastitkoanastasia@gmail.comРАНХиГС; Новая школа социальных исследованийРоссияRussian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration; New School for Social ResearchRussian Federation201720062017065870Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20172017Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/312

В статье рассматриваются особенности взаимодействия компаний на рынках взаимодополняемых по производству товаров в России. Они обусловлены, во-первых, технологией производства, при которой из одного сырья при едином производственном процессе получается несколько товаров; во-вторых, последствиями приватизации производственных мощностей, созданных еще в советское время. В статье предложена теоретико-игровая модель, с помощью которой показано, как компании могут использовать антимонопольный орган при выстраивании взаимоотношений друг с другом. Это наряду с другими причинами объясняет бум антимонопольных дел по статье о злоупотреблении доминирующим положением в последнее время, в которые были вовлечены компании, выпускающие взаимодополняемые по производству товары.

The article considers the particularities of the relations between companies in the markets of joint products in Russia. These particularities correspond, first, to the production technology, when one input through unit production process gives several products; second, to the consequences of the privatization of production facilities created during the Soviet Union period. The article offers a game theory model that shows how companies may use antitrust authority in their interaction strategies. This in addition to other reasons might explain the amount of cases on the abuse of dominant position where companies, which produce joint products, are involved.

антимонопольная политикаприватизацияjoint productsantitrustprivatizationReferencesГолованова С. В. (2013). Доктрина основных мощностей в российской антимонопольной политике: основания и риски применения // Экономическая политика. № 3. С. 126-143Golovanova S. V. (2013). The doctrine of key facilities in the Russian antimonopoly policy: Basic factors and risks of using. Ekonomicheskaya Politika, No. 3, pp. 126—143. (In Russian).Коуз Р. (1993). Фирма, рынок и право. М.: ДелоCoase R. (1993). The firm, the market and the law. Moscow: Delo. (In Russian).Шаститко А. Е., Мелешкина А. И., Шаститко А. А. (2015). Распределение издержек, регулирование и стимулы в сфере совместного производства товаров // Вестник МГУ. № 1. С. 18-40Shastitko A. E., Meleshkina A. I., Shastitko A. A. (2015). Cost allocation, regulation and incentives under goods joint production. Vestnik MSU, No. 1, pp. 18—40. (In Russian).Шаститко А., Шаститко А. (2015). Рынки связанных по производству товаров: теоретическая модель и уроки для правоприменения // Вопросы экономики. № 2. С. 104-122Shastitko A., Shastitko A. (2015). Markets of joint products: Theoretical model and policy implications. Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 2, pp. 104—122. (In Russian).Улицкий Л. И. (1960). Вопросы экономики коксохимической промышленности СССР. М.: ГНТИ литературы по черной и цветной металлургииUlitsky L. I. (1960). Economic issues of the coke-chemical industry. Moscow: GNTI Literatury po Chernoy i Tsvetnoy Metallurgii. (In Russian).Avdasheva S., Kryuchkova P. (2014). The “reactive” model of antitrust enforcement: When private interests dictate enforcement actions - The Russian case. International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 43, No. C, pp. 200-208.Avdasheva S., Kryuchkova P. (2014). The “reactive” model of antitrust enforcement: When private interests dictate enforcement actions - The Russian case. International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 43, No. C, pp. 200-208.Avdasheva S. (2016). Models of monopoly in the quarter-century development of Russian competition policy: Understanding competition analysis in the abuse of dominance investigations. In: F. Jenny, Y. Katsoulacos (eds.). Competition law enforcement in the BRICS and in developing countries. Springer International Publishing, pp. 239-262.Avdasheva S. (2016). Models of monopoly in the quarter-century development of Russian competition policy: Understanding competition analysis in the abuse of dominance investigations. In: F. Jenny, Y. Katsoulacos (eds.). Competition law enforcement in the BRICS and in developing countries. Springer International Publishing, pp. 239-262.Blair R. D., Kaserman D. L., Romano R. E. (1989). A pedagogical treatment of bilateral monopoly. Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 831-841.Blair R. D., Kaserman D. L., Romano R. E. (1989). A pedagogical treatment of bilateral monopoly. Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 831-841.Blanchard O., Kremer M. (1997). Disorganization. William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series, No. 38.Blanchard O., Kremer M. (1997). Disorganization. William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series, No. 38.Grossman S. J., Hart O. D. (1986). The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 691-719.Grossman S. J., Hart O. D. (1986). The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 691-719.Hart O. D., Moore J. (1990). Property rights and the nature of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 6, pp. 1119-1158.Hart O. D., Moore J. (1990). Property rights and the nature of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 6, pp. 1119-1158.Joskow P. L. (2002). Transaction cost economics. Antitrust rules, and remedies. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 95-116.Joskow P. L. (2002). Transaction cost economics. Antitrust rules, and remedies. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 95-116.Klein B. R., Crawford R. G., Alchian A. A. (1978). Vertical integration, appropriable rents and the competitive contracting process. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 297-326.Klein B. R., Crawford R. G., Alchian A. A. (1978). Vertical integration, appropriable rents and the competitive contracting process. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 297-326.Nash J. F. (1950). The bargaining problem. Econometrica, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 155-162.Nash J. F. (1950). The bargaining problem. Econometrica, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 155-162.Nash J. F. (1953). Two-person cooperative games. Econometrica, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 128-140.Nash J. F. (1953). Two-person cooperative games. Econometrica, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 128-140.Sen A. (1990). Gender and cooperative conflicts. Tinker I persistent inequalities. New York: Oxford University Press.Sen A. (1990). Gender and cooperative conflicts. Tinker I persistent inequalities. New York: Oxford University Press.Williamson O. E. (1971). The vertical integration of production: Market failure considerations. American Economic Review, Vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 112-123.Williamson O. E. (1971). The vertical integration of production: Market failure considerations. American Economic Review, Vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 112-123.Williamson O. E. (1979). Transaction cost economics: The governance of contractual relationships. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 233-261.Williamson O. E. (1979). Transaction cost economics: The governance of contractual relationships. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 233-261.Williamson O. E. (1996). Mechanisms of governance. New York: Oxford University Press.Williamson O. E. (1996). Mechanisms of governance. New York: Oxford University Press.

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.