voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2022-1-47-71voprecotest-3074Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORYИнституциональные изменения, неравенство и долгосрочное экономическое развитие: теория и эмпирикаInstitutional changes, inequality and long-run economic development: Theory and empiricshttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-6634-2159ВеселовД. А.VeselovD. A.

Веселов Дмитрий Александрович, к.э.н., Ph.D., старший научный сотрудник Международной лаборатории макроэкономического анализа, доцент департамента теоретической экономики НИУ ВШЭ

Москва

Dmitry A. Veselov

Moscow

dveselov@hse.ruhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-2094-7942ЯркинА. М.YarkinA. M.

Яркин Александр Михайлович, докторант

Провиденс

Aleksander M. Yarkin

Providence

alexander_yarkin@brown.eduНациональный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»РоссияHSE UniversityRussian FederationУниверситет БраунаСоединённые Штаты АмерикиBrown UniversityUnited States202211012022014771Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20222022Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/3074

В статье предложен обзор теоретических и эмпирических работ по долгосрочному экономическому развитию, институциональной динамике и их взаимосвязи. Особое внимание уделяется работам, в которых исследуются причины блокирования необходимых для роста институциональных реформ. Среди этих причин в работах последних лет центральное место занимает неравенство в распределении богатства и политической власти. Обзор построен вокруг двух ключевых подходов к объяснению перехода от стагнации к современному экономическому росту и межстрановому расхождению в доходах — единой теории роста и теории эндогенных институциональных реформ. На примерах дивергенции между странами Европы и Ближнего Востока, а также внутри группы европейских стран демонстрируется вклад данных подходов в объяснение расхождения траекторий развития стран. Предлагается несколько направлений исследований, в которых возможен наибольший прогресс в ближайшие годы.

This paper reviews theoretical and empirical literature on long-run economic development, institutional dynamics, and their interplay. Special attention is given to papers that explore the reasons why pro-growth reforms and institutional changes may be blocked. Among these reasons, over the past years the literature has increasingly focused on inequality in the distribution of wealth and political power as a key factor. This review is structured around two major theoretical approaches that illuminate the reasons behind the transition from stagnation to growth and cross-country income divergence: the unified growth theory (UGT), and the theory of endogenous institutional change. Using the empirical evidence on divergence between European and Middle Eastern economies, as well as the divergence within Europe, the paper demonstrates the value of these approaches in explaining the observed patterns of cross-country long-run development. The paper concludes with outlining several promising directions for future research.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.