voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2017-5-116-135voprecotest-306Research ArticleТЕОРИЯ ИГР И ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ НАУКАGAME THEORY AND ECONOMICSКуда движется теория игр? К теории обучения в играхWhither game theory? Towards a theory oflearning in gamesФьюденбергД.FudenbergD.

проф. Массачусетского технологического института (Кэмбридж, США)

drew.fudenberg@gmail.comЛивайнД. К.LevineD. K.

проф. Европейского университета во Флоренции (Италия) и Университета Вашингтона в Сент-Луисе (США)

david@dklevine.comМассачусетский технологический институтСоединённые Штаты АмерикиMassachusets Institute of TechnologyUnited StatesЕвропейский университет во Флоренции; Университет Вашингтона в Сент-ЛуисеСоединённые Штаты АмерикиEuropean University Institute; Washington University in St. LouisUnited States20172005201705116135Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20172017Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/306

Теория игр достигла необыкновенных успехов в рамках экономической науки. Были получены ответы на многие важные вопросы, теоретико-игровые методы теперь играют ключевую роль в экономических исследованиях. В статье показано, в каких областях необходимы дальнейшие изыскания. Утверждается, что модели обучения позволят усовершенствовать и расширить предсказательную силу теории игр, сохранив имеющиеся успешные приложения. Особый акцент сделан на необходимости точнее исследовать скорость обучения.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.