voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2017-4-79-99voprecotest-295Research ArticleДЕНЕЖНО-КРЕДИТНАЯ ПОЛИТИКАMONETARY POLICYЦеновые взаимодействия на российском кредитном рынке: кто с кем воюет и когда образует сговор?Price interactions in the Russian credit market: Who is fighting whom and when do banks facilitate collusion?МамоновМ. Е.MamonovM.

к. э. н., старший научный сотрудник лаборатории анализа и прогноза экономических процессов Национального исследовательского университета «Высшая школа экономики»; руководитель группы банковских исследований Центра макроэкономического анализа и краткосрочного прогнозирования в Институте народнохозяйственного прогнозирования РАН (Москва)

mmamonov@forecast.ruНациональный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики» (НИУ ВШЭ); Институт народнохозяйственного прогнозирования РАНРоссияNational Research University Higher School of Economics; Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting, Institute of Economic Forecasting, RASRussian Federation201720042017047999Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20172017Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/295

В работе анализируются ценовые реакции банков на процентную политику конкурентов в периоды усиления ценовой конкуренции на различных фазах бизнес-цикла в розничном и корпоративном сегментах кредитного рынка России. Расчеты на основе моделей новой теории отраслевых рынков (New Industrial Empirical Organization, NIEO) показали, что ценовые войны на российском кредитном рынке случаются и в розничном, и в корпоративном сегментах, чаще - в кризисные периоды, и инициируются в основном банками из топ-30 по размеру активов (кроме Сбербанка) - самой воинственной группы в российской банковской системе. В бескризисные периоды банки переходят к сговорам. Розничный сегмент кредитного рынка намного более конкурентный, чем корпоративный.

This paper analyzes how banks react on the interest rate policy of their rivals when the industry-wide price competition is strengthening over different phases of business cycle in both retail and corporate segments of credit market in Russia. Our estimations, based on the models proposed in the literature on New Industrial Empirical Organization (NIEO), show that price wars are taking place from time to time in the retail as well as in the corporate segments of Russian credit market; more often - in periods of macroeconomic crisis, and are started by the banks from the top-30 group (in terms of assets, excluding Sberbank), the most warlike group within the Russian banking system. During the non-crisis periods banks are turning to facilitate collusions. The retail segment of credit market appears to be significantly more competitive as compared to the corporate one.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.