voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2017-4-5-37voprecotest-292Research ArticleЭКОНОМИКА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОГО СЕКТОРАECONOMICS OF PUBLIC SECTORГосударственная собственность и характеристики эффективностиState ownership and efficiency characteristicsАбрамовА. Е.AbramovA.

к. э. н., завлабораторией анализа институтов и финансовых рынков Института прикладных экономических исследований (ИПЭИ) Российской академии народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте РФ (РАНХиГС) (Москва)

ae_abramov@mail.ruРадыгинА. Д.RadyginA.

д. э. н., проф., декан экономического факультета РАНХиГС, член совета директоров Института экономической политики имени Е. Т. Гайдара (Москва)

arad@ranepa.ruЧерноваМ. И.ChernovaM.

научный сотрудник лаборатории анализа институтов и финансовых рынков ИПЭИ РАНХиГС

marychernova@gmail.comЭнтовР. М.EntovR.

академик РАН (Москва)

entov@iep.ruРоссийская академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте РФ (РАНХиГС)РоссияRussian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public AdministrationRussian FederationРоссийская академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте РФ (РАНХиГС); Институт экономической политики имени Е. Т. ГайдараРоссияRussian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration; Gaidar Institute for Economic PolicyRussian FederationРоссийская Академия НаукРоссияRussian Academy of SciencesRussian Federation20172004201704537Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20172017Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/292

В данной статье на примере выборки из 114 крупнейших российских компаний оценивается влияние размера пакета акций (долей), находящегося в государственной собственности, на характеристики финансовой эффективности компаний. В качестве косвенных индикаторов эффективности использованы финансовые показатели: валовая рентабельность и рентабельность собственного капитала, а также рентабельность продаж и долговая нагрузка. Отдельно учтены эффекты прямой и косвенной государственной собственности. Эконометрические расчеты показывают, что размер пакета акций (доли), находящегося в государственной собственности в целом, отрицательно влияет на характеристики эффективности, а его увеличение сопряжено с ростом долговой нагрузки компаний. По выбранным критериям компании с государственным участием уступают частным компаниям. Выявлено, что изменение рентабельности частных компаний характеризуется значимой зависимостью от движения косвенных характеристик производительности труда. В то же время у компаний с государственным участием не удалось обнаружить связи между прибылью на капитал и характеристиками эффективности. Установлено, что влияние прямой и косвенной государственной собственности на характеристики эффективности компаний с государственным участием носит разнонаправленный характер: повышение размера прямой государственной собственности ведет к снижению производительности труда и показателей рентабельности; влияние косвенной государственной собственности оказывается противоположным.

The paper examines the influence of state participation in the ownership structure of companies on their financial efficiency using a sample of 114 largest companies in Russia. As an indirect indicator of efficiency we used a variety of financial indicators: revenue per employee (gross margin), return on equity, profit margin and debt burden. The authors have tried to discriminate the influence of direct and indirect state ownership. Using econometric analysis we conclude that the size of the block of shares owned by the state has negative effect on the performance characteristics, and its increase is associated with an increase in the debt burden of companies. According to our criteria, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on average perform worse than private companies. The study shows that a change in the profitability of private companies is characterized by a significant dependence on the movement of indirect productivity characteristics. At the same time, for SOEs the similar correlation between return on equity and efficiency characteristics was not revealed. The study shows that the increase of the size of direct government ownership leads to lower productivity and profitability; the impact of indirect state ownership is, seemingly, more complicated.

государственная собственностькомпании с государственным участиемприватизациякапитализациясмешанная форма собственностичастные компанииstate ownershipstate-owned enterprisesprivatizationcapitali- zationmixed ownershipprivate companiesReferencesАбрамов А., Радыгин А., Чернова М. (2016). Компании с государственным участием на российском рынке: структура собственности и роль в экономике // Вопросы экономики. № 12. С. 61-87Abramov A., Radygin A., Chernova M. (2016). State-owned enterprises in the Russian market: Ownership structure and their role in economy. Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 12, pp. 61—87. (In Russian).Гегель Г. В. Ф. (1990). Философия права. М.: МысльHegel G. V. F. (1990). Legal philosophy as a theory of justice. Moscow: Mysl. (In Russian).Долгопятова Т. Г., Ивасаки И., Яковлев А. А. (2009). Российский бизнес 20 лет спустя: путь от социалистического предприятия к рыночной фирме // Мир России. № 9. С. 89-114Dolgopyatova T. G., Iwasaki I., Yakovlev A. A. (2009). Russian business 20 years later: The path of the socialist enterprise to the market company. Mir Rossii, No. 9, pp. 89—114. (In Russian).Коуз Р., Ван Н. (2016). Как Китай стал капиталистическим. М.: Новое издательствоCoase R., Wang N. (2016). How China has become capitalist. Moscow: Novoye Izdatelstvo. (In Russian).Кузнецов П., Муравьев А. (2000). Государственные холдинги как механизм управления предприятиями государственного сектора // Вопросы экономики. № 9. C. 34-47Kuznetsov P., Muravyov A. (2000). State holdings as a control mechanism for public sector enterprises. Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 9, pp. 34—47. (In Russian).Лин Дж. Й. (2013). Демистификация китайской экономики. М.: МысльLin J. Y. (2013). Demystifying the Chinese economy. Moscow: Mysl. (In Russian).Мюллер Д. (2007). Общественный выбор III. М.: ГУ ВШЭMueller D. (2007). Public choice III. Moscow: HSE Publ. (In Russian).Полтерович В. М. (2012). Приватизация и рациональная структура собственности. М.: Институт экономики РАНPolterovich V. M. (2012). Privatization and rational ownership structure. Moscow: Institute of Economics, RAS. (In Russian).Радыгин А. Д., Энтов Р. М. (2001). Корпоративное управление и защита прав собственности: эмпирический анализ и актуальные направления реформ (Научные труды № 36Р). М.: Институт экономики переходного периодаRadygin A. D., Entov R. M. (2001). Corporate governance and the protection of property rights: An empirical analysis of current trends and reforms (Working Paper No. 36Р). Moscow: Institute for the Economy in Transition.Радыгин А. Д. (ред.) (2014). Приватизация в современном мире: теория, эмпирика, «новое измерение» для России: в 2-х т. М.: ДелоRadygin A. D. (ed.) (2014). Privatization in the modern world: The theory, empirics, “a new dimension” for Russia: In 2 vols. Moscow: Delo. (In Russian).Радыгин А., Симачев Ю., Энтов Р. (2015). Государственная компания: сфера проявления «провалов государства» или «провалов рынка»? // Вопросы экономики. № 1. С. 45-79Radygin A., Simachev Y., Entov R. (2015). The state-owned company: “State failure” or “market failure”? Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 1, pp. 45—79. (In Russian).Радыгин А., Энтов Р. (2012). «Провалы государства»: теория и политика // Вопросы экономики. № 12. С. 4-30Radygin A., Entov R. (2012). Government failures: Theory and policy. Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 12, pp. 4—30. (In Russian).Радыгин А. Д., Энтов Р. М. (2013). «Фундаментальная» теорема приватизации: идеология, эволюция, практика // Экономическая политика. № 6. С. 7-45Radygin A. D., Entov R. M. (2013). “Fundamental” theorem of privatization: Ideology, evolution, practice. Ekonomicheskaya Politika, No. 6, pp. 7—45. (In Russian).Теплова Т. В. (2012). Постприватизационное функционирование компаний на трех рынках постсоветского пространства: сопоставление частных и смешанных по структуре собственности компаний // XIII Международная научная конференция по проблемам развития экономики и общества: в 4 кн. М.: Издат. дом НИУ ВШЭ, Кн. 1. С. 532-539Teplova T. V. (2012). Post-privatization operation of companies in the three markets of the former Soviet Union: A comparison of private and mixed companies according to the ownership structure. In: Proceedings of the XIII International academic conference on economic and social development: In 4 books. Moscow: HSE Publ., Book 1, pp. 532—539. (In Russian).Фоминых А. (2004). Сопоставление эффективности государственного и негосударственного секторов: статистический подход // Вопросы экономики. № 9. С. 64-75Fominykh A. (2004). Relative inefficiency of the state and private sectors: The statistical approach. Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 9, pp. 64—75. (In Russian).Acemoglu D. (2006). Modeling inefficient institutions. In: R. Blundell, Wh. Newey, T. Persson (eds.). Advances in economic theory, Proceedings of 2005 World Congress. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, pp. 341-380.Acemoglu D. (2006). Modeling inefficient institutions. In: R. Blundell, Wh. Newey, T. Persson (eds.). Advances in economic theory, Proceedings of 2005 World Congress. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, pp. 341-380.Aghion P., Holden R. (2011). Incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm: What have we learned over the past 25 years? Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 25, pp. 181-197.Aghion P., Holden R. (2011). Incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm: What have we learned over the past 25 years? Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 25, pp. 181-197.Aghion P., Bolton P. (1992). An ‘incomplete contracts’ approach to financial contracting. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 473-494.Aghion P., Bolton P. (1992). An ‘incomplete contracts’ approach to financial contracting. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 473-494.Anderson J., Lee Y., Murrell P. (2000). Competition and privatization amidst weak institutions: Evidence from Mongolia. Economic Inquiry, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 527-549.Anderson J., Lee Y., Murrell P. (2000). Competition and privatization amidst weak institutions: Evidence from Mongolia. Economic Inquiry, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 527-549.Ang J. S., Ding D. K. (2006). Government ownership and the performance of government-linked companies: The case of Singapore. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 64-88.Ang J. S., Ding D. K. (2006). Government ownership and the performance of government-linked companies: The case of Singapore. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 64-88.Barja G., McKenzie D., Urquiola M. (2005). Bolivian capitalization and privatization: Approximation to an evaluation. In: J. Nellis, N. Birdsall (eds.). Reality check: The distributional impact of privatization in developing countries. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, pp. 123-177.Barja G., McKenzie D., Urquiola M. (2005). Bolivian capitalization and privatization: Approximation to an evaluation. In: J. Nellis, N. Birdsall (eds.). Reality check: The distributional impact of privatization in developing countries. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, pp. 123-177.Boardman A. E., Vining A. R. (1989). Ownership and performance in competitive environments: A comparison of the performance of private, mixed and state-owned enterprises. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 1-33.Boardman A. E., Vining A. R. (1989). Ownership and performance in competitive environments: A comparison of the performance of private, mixed and state-owned enterprises. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 1-33.Bokov V., Vernikov A. V. (2008). Quality of governance and bank valuation in Russia: An empirical study. Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 3, No. 7, pp. 5-16.Bokov V., Vernikov A. V. (2008). Quality of governance and bank valuation in Russia: An empirical study. Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 3, No. 7, pp. 5-16.Bolton P., Scharfstein D. (1990). A theory of predation based on agency problem in financial contracting. American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 1, pp. 94-106.Bolton P., Scharfstein D. (1990). A theory of predation based on agency problem in financial contracting. American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 1, pp. 94-106.Borcherding T., Pommerehne W., Schneider F. (1982). Comparing the efficiency of private and public production: The evidence from five countries. Zeitschrift für Nationaloekonomie, Bd. 89, S. 127-156.Borcherding T., Pommerehne W., Schneider F. (1982). Comparing the efficiency of private and public production: The evidence from five countries. Zeitschrift für Nationaloekonomie, Bd. 89, S. 127-156.Boubakri N., Cosset J.-C., Saffar W. (2013). The role of state and foreign owners in corporate risk-taking: Evidence from privatization. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 108, No. 3, pp. 641-658.Boubakri N., Cosset J.-C., Saffar W. (2013). The role of state and foreign owners in corporate risk-taking: Evidence from privatization. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 108, No. 3, pp. 641-658.Brown J. D., Earle J. S., Telegdy A. (2006). The productivity effects of privatization: Longitudinal estimates from Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 114, No. 1, pp. 61-99.Brown J. D., Earle J. S., Telegdy A. (2006). The productivity effects of privatization: Longitudinal estimates from Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 114, No. 1, pp. 61-99.Claessens S., Djankov S. (2002). Privatization benefits in Eastern Europe. Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 83, No. 3, pp. 307-324.Claessens S., Djankov S. (2002). Privatization benefits in Eastern Europe. Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 83, No. 3, pp. 307-324.Dewenter K. L., Malatesta P. H. (1997). Public offerings of state-owned and privately-owned enterprises: An international comparison. Journal of Finance, Vol. 62, No. 4, pp. 1659-1679.Dewenter K. L., Malatesta P. H. (1997). Public offerings of state-owned and privately-owned enterprises: An international comparison. Journal of Finance, Vol. 62, No. 4, pp. 1659-1679.Diamond D. (1991). Debt maturity structure and liquidity risk. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, pp. 1027-1054.Diamond D. (1991). Debt maturity structure and liquidity risk. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, pp. 1027-1054.EBRD (1994-2002). Transition Report. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.EBRD (1994-2002). Transition Report. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.Estrin S., Hanousek J., Kočenda E., Svejnar J. (2009). The effects of privatization and ownership in transition economies. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 699-728.Estrin S., Hanousek J., Kočenda E., Svejnar J. (2009). The effects of privatization and ownership in transition economies. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 699-728.Filatochev I., Wright M., Bleaney M. (1999). Privatization, insider control, and managerial entrenchment in Russia. Economics of Transition, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 481-504.Filatochev I., Wright M., Bleaney M. (1999). Privatization, insider control, and managerial entrenchment in Russia. Economics of Transition, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 481-504.Frydman R., Gray C., Hessel M., Rapaczynski A. (1999). When does privatization work? The impact of private ownership on corporate performance in the transition economies. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114, No. 4, pp. 1153-1191.Frydman R., Gray C., Hessel M., Rapaczynski A. (1999). When does privatization work? The impact of private ownership on corporate performance in the transition economies. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114, No. 4, pp. 1153-1191.Frydman R., Rapaczynski A., Earle J. S. (1993). The privatization process in Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic States. Budapest: Central European University Press.Frydman R., Rapaczynski A., Earle J. S. (1993). The privatization process in Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic States. Budapest: Central European University Press.Ghazouani S., Naceur S., Omran M. (2007). The performance of newly privatized firms in selected MENA countries: The role of ownership structure, governance and liberalization policies. International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 332-353.Ghazouani S., Naceur S., Omran M. (2007). The performance of newly privatized firms in selected MENA countries: The role of ownership structure, governance and liberalization policies. International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 332-353.Grossman S., Hart O. (1986). The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 691-719.Grossman S., Hart O. (1986). The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 691-719.Gunasekarage A., Hess K., Hu A. J. (2007). The influence of the degree of state owner- ship and the ownership concentration on the performance of listed Chinese companies. Research in International Business and Finance, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 379-395.Gunasekarage A., Hess K., Hu A. J. (2007). The influence of the degree of state owner- ship and the ownership concentration on the performance of listed Chinese companies. Research in International Business and Finance, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 379-395.Harris M., Raviv A. (1990). Capital structure and the informational role of debt. Journal of Finance, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 321-350.Harris M., Raviv A. (1990). Capital structure and the informational role of debt. Journal of Finance, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 321-350.Hausman J. (1978). Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica, Vol. 46, No. 6, pp. 1251-1271.Hausman J. (1978). Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica, Vol. 46, No. 6, pp. 1251-1271.Hoppe E., Schmitz P. (2010). Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks. Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 94, No. 3-4, pp. 258-268.Hoppe E., Schmitz P. (2010). Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks. Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 94, No. 3-4, pp. 258-268.Johnson S., McMillan J., Woodruff C. (2000). Entrepreneurs and the ordering of institutional reform: Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine compared. Economics of Transition, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 1-36.Johnson S., McMillan J., Woodruff C. (2000). Entrepreneurs and the ordering of institutional reform: Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine compared. Economics of Transition, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 1-36.Johnson S., McMillan J., Woodruff C. (2002). Property rights and finance. American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 5, pp. 1335-1356.Johnson S., McMillan J., Woodruff C. (2002). Property rights and finance. American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 5, pp. 1335-1356.Kočenda E., Svejnar J. (2003). Ownership and firm performance after large-scale privatization. William Davidson Institute Working Paper, No. 471a.Kočenda E., Svejnar J. (2003). Ownership and firm performance after large-scale privatization. William Davidson Institute Working Paper, No. 471a.La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., Vishny R. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, No. 6, pp. 1113-1155.La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., Vishny R. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, No. 6, pp. 1113-1155.La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 471-517.La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 471-517.La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., Vishny R. (2000). Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58, No. 1-2, pp. 3-27.La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., Vishny R. (2000). Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58, No. 1-2, pp. 3-27.Marcincin A., van Wijnbergen S. (1995). Voucher privatization, corporate control and the cost of capital: An analysis of the Czech privatization programme. CEPR Discussion Papers, No. 1215.Marcincin A., van Wijnbergen S. (1995). Voucher privatization, corporate control and the cost of capital: An analysis of the Czech privatization programme. CEPR Discussion Papers, No. 1215.McConnell J., Servacs H. (1990). Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 595-613.McConnell J., Servacs H. (1990). Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 595-613.Minguez-Vera A., Martin-Ugedo J. F. (2007). Does ownership structure affect value? A panel data analysis for the Spanish market. International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 81-98.Minguez-Vera A., Martin-Ugedo J. F. (2007). Does ownership structure affect value? A panel data analysis for the Spanish market. International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 81-98.Mitra P., Selowsky M. (2002). Transition - The first ten years: Analysis and lessons for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: World Bank.Mitra P., Selowsky M. (2002). Transition - The first ten years: Analysis and lessons for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: World Bank.Ng А., Yuce A., Chen E. (2009). Determinants of state equity ownership, and its effect on value/performance: China’s privatized firms. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 413-443.Ng А., Yuce A., Chen E. (2009). Determinants of state equity ownership, and its effect on value/performance: China’s privatized firms. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 413-443.Omran M. (2009). Post-privatization corporate governance and firm performance: The role of private ownership concentration, identity and board composition. Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 658-673.Omran M. (2009). Post-privatization corporate governance and firm performance: The role of private ownership concentration, identity and board composition. Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 658-673.Pham C. D., Carlin T. M. (2008). Financial performance of privatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Vietnam. Journal of International Business Research, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Special Issue), pp. 105-125.Pham C. D., Carlin T. M. (2008). Financial performance of privatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Vietnam. Journal of International Business Research, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Special Issue), pp. 105-125.Sappington D., Stiglitz J. (1987). Privatization, information and incentives. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 567-582.Sappington D., Stiglitz J. (1987). Privatization, information and incentives. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 567-582.Shapiro C., Willig R. (1990). Economic rationales for the scope of privatization. In: E. Suleiman, J. Waterbury (eds.). The political economy of public sector reform and privatization. London: Westview Press, pp. 55-87.Shapiro C., Willig R. (1990). Economic rationales for the scope of privatization. In: E. Suleiman, J. Waterbury (eds.). The political economy of public sector reform and privatization. London: Westview Press, pp. 55-87.Shirley M., Walsh P. (2000). Public versus private ownership: The current state of the debate. WB Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2420.Shirley M., Walsh P. (2000). Public versus private ownership: The current state of the debate. WB Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2420.Shleifer A., Vishny R. (1994). Politicians and firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4, pp. 995-1025.Shleifer A., Vishny R. (1994). Politicians and firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4, pp. 995-1025.Thomsen S., Pedersen T. (2000). Ownership structure and economic performance in the largest European companies. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 21, No. 6, pp. 689-705.Thomsen S., Pedersen T. (2000). Ownership structure and economic performance in the largest European companies. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 21, No. 6, pp. 689-705.Wei Z., Xie F., Zhang Sh. (2005). Ownership structure and firm value in China’s privatized firms: 1991-2001. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 87-108.Wei Z., Xie F., Zhang Sh. (2005). Ownership structure and firm value in China’s privatized firms: 1991-2001. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 87-108.

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.