voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2020-3-47-62voprecotest-2741Research ArticleЭКОНОМИКА ПРЕДПРИЯТИЙENTERPRISE ECONOMICSКаким фирмам государство оказывает поддержку: анализ изменения приоритетов в кризисных условияхWhat kind of Russian firms get state support? The analysis of changes in priorities under crisis conditionshttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-2273-0971ЯковлевА. А.YakovlevAndrei A.

Яковлев Андрей Александрович, к. э. н., проф., директор Института анализа предприятий и рынков (ИАПР) НИУ ВШЭ

Москва

Moscow

ayakovlev@hse.ruhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-0185-4182ЕршоваН. В.ErshovaNina V.

Ершова Нина Владимировна, к. э. н., н. с. ИАПР НИУ ВШЭ

Москва

Moscow

nershova@hse.ruhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-0469-8701УвароваО. М.UvarovaOlga M.

Уварова Ольга Михайловна, ведущий эксперт ИАПР НИУ ВШЭ

Москва

Moscow

ouvarova@hse.ruНациональный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»РоссияNational Research University Higher School of EconomicsRussian Federation202010032020034762Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20202020Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/2741

В статье рассматривается изменение приоритетов государственной поддержки для крупных и средних предприятий обрабатывающей промышленности на фоне кризисов 2008—2009 и 2014—2015 гг. На данных трех опросов, проведенных в 2009, 2014 и 2018 гг., с помощью logit-регрессий выделяются факторы получения предприятиями финансовой и организационной поддержки от государства на разных уровнях власти. Анализ показывает, что по сравнению с 2007—2008 гг. в 2012—2013 гг. в промышленности заметно сократилась доля фирм, получавших господдержку, при ее одновременной концентрации на предприятиях, имеющих лоббистский ресурс (участие государства в собственности и членство фирм в бизнес-ассоциациях). В 2016—2017 гг. масштабы господдержки начали восстанавливаться. При этом на всех властных уровнях поддержка оказывалась фирмам, которые осуществляли инвестиции и помогали властям в социальном развитии региона, а фактор участия государства в собственности стал незначимым. В статье предлагается возможное объяснение выявленных сдвигов в критериях предоставления господдержки.

The paper analyzes the shifts in government priorities in terms of support of big and medium manufacturing enterprises amid 2008—2009 and 2014—2015 crises. Based on the data of 2009, 2014 and 2018 surveys of Russian manufacturing firms, using logit regressions we identify factors that affect the receipt of financial and organizational support at different levels of government. The analysis shows that in 2012—2013 the share of manufacturing firms that received state support shrank significantly as compared to 2007—2008; moreover, the support concentrated on enterprises that had access to lobbying resource (such as state participation in the ownership or business associations membership). In 2016—2017 the scale of state support coverage recovered. However, the support at all levels of government was provided to firms that carried out investment and provided assistance to regional or local authorities in social development of the region, while the factor of state participation in the ownership became insignificant. The paper provides possible explanation for these shifts in the criteria of state support provision in Russia.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.