voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2020-5-141-160voprecotest-2682Research ArticleРАЗМЫШЛЕНИЯ НАД КНИГОЙREFLECTIONS ON THE BOOKТеория контрактов как единая дисциплина (К выходу на русском языке книги Патрика Болтона и Матиаса Деватрипонта «Теория контрактов»)Contract theory as a unified discipline (On the occasion of the Russian publication of “Contract Theory” by Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont)РанневаН. А.RannevaN. A.

Раннева Нонна Александровна, к. э. н., с. н. с. отдела экономической теории

Москва

Nonna A. Ranneva

Moscow

nranneva@yandex.ruНациональный исследовательский институт мировой экономики и международных отношений имени Е. М. Примакова Российской академии наукРоссияPrimakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of SciencesRussian Federation20201205202005141160Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20202020Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/2682

Статья посвящена изданию на русском языке одного из наиболее важных учебников по теории контрактов за последние 20—30 лет. С момента публикации книги в 2005 г. «Теория контрактов» стала обязательным англоязычным пособием для тех, кто специализируется по данному предмету, во всех ведущих университетах мира. Перевод книги на русский язык — важное событие в научной жизни, поскольку данный учебник для своей области знаний уникален: он дает наиболее общее систематизированное представление о громадной области современной экономической науки. В статье предлагается общий обзор содержания книги, представлена краткая эволюция теории контрактов и общих подходов к анализу обмена на примере данной работы и других исследований. Рассматриваются основные идеи и понятия, которые возникли в связи с развитием теории контрактов, а также общие модели и методы, которые делают эту дисциплину единой наукой.

The article is devoted to the Russian edition in 2019 of perhaps the most important textbook on the theory of contracts in the last twenty-thirty years. From the very moment of its publication, in 2005, “Contract theory” by Bolton and Dewatripont has become the definitive English text on the topic for graduate students in all leading economic universities of the world. The translation of the book into Russian is an important event, since this textbook is unique: it provides the most general systemic overview of the huge field of contemporary economics, called contract theory, and which has evolved greatly for the last 30 years. The article gives the general overview of the book and briefly describes the evolution of the theory of contracts and general approach to the analysis of exchange of goods and services in the economy on the basis of this book and other literature. The article focuses on reviewing general ideas and concepts introduced by contract theory and the main models and methods that have made this domain a unified science.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.