voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2017-1-5-21voprecotest-266Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORYОсновы теории контрактов (Нобелевская премия по экономике 2016 года - Оливер Харт и Бенгт Хольмстрем)Basics of contract theory (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences 2016 - Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström)ИзмалковС. Б.IzmalkovS.

PhD, проф. Российской экономической школы (Москва)

sizmalkov@nes.ruСонинК. И.SoninK.

к.  ф.-м.  н., проф. Чикагского университета (Чикаго, США) и НИУ ВШЭ (Москва)

ksonin@uchicago.eduРоссийская экономическая школаРоссияNew Economic SchoolRussian FederationЧикагский университет ; НИУ ВШЭСоединённые Штаты АмерикиUniversity of Chicago; National Research University Higher School of EconomicsUnited States20172001201701521Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20172017Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/266

Нобелевская премия по экономике 2016 года присуждена Оливеру Харту и Бенгту Хольмстрему за работы, ставшие фундаментом современной теории контрактов. Харт и и Хольмстрем показали, что анализ стратегического взаимодействия экономических субъектов, владеющих разной информацией, можно успешно применить, чтобы ответить на самые естественные вопросы. Как должна быть устроена система вознаграждения менеджеров в фирме? Зачем страховые контракты обычно включают разделение ответственности, если страховой случай произошел? Почему одни фирмы используют аутсорсинг, а другие - нет? В статье кратко описывается основная модель теории контрактов и рассказывается о достижениях нобелевских лауреатов по экономике 2016 года.

The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences was awarded to Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström “for their contributions to contract theory”. In their papers, they have demonstrated that strategic analysis of environments with asymmetric information might be very fruitful in providing answers to many natural economic questions: How should firms reward their managers? Why insurance contracts often include deductibles and co-payments? When do firms outsource and when do they prefer in-house production? In its brief exposition, the paper starts with the basics of contract theory and discusses some most important results of 2016 laureates.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.