voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2016-11-57-75voprecotest-253Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORYО границах неразрешимости «Проблемы безбилетника»On the limits of unsolvability of the “free rider problem”ЮдановА. Ю.YudanovA.

д.  э.  н., проф. кафедры «Экономическая теория»

yudanov@yandex.ruПыркинаО. Е.PyrkinaO.

к.ф.-м.н., доцент кафедры «Теория вероятностей и математическая статистика»

olga.pyrkina@gmail.comБеккерЕ. Г.BekkerE.

к.э.н., доцент кафедры «Экономическая теория». Финансовый университет при Правительстве РФ (Москва)

lena_becker@mail.ruФинансовый университет при Правительстве РФРоссияFinancial University under the Government of the Russian FederationRussian Federation2016201120160115775Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20162016Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/253

В статье переосмысливается классическая «проблема безбилетника» с позиций учета влияния на безбилетника его ближнего окружения. Вводятся понятия общего и частного вреда от деятельности безбилетника. Описан широкий класс проявлений «безбилетничества», при которых частный вред, наносимымый значимым социальным группам, достаточно велик, чтобы вызвать с их стороны активное противодействие безбилетнику. Утверждается, что при наличии должных институциональных условий это сопротивление приводит к эффективному решению проблемы безбилетника.

The article reinterprets the classic «free rider problem» known as unsolvable from the position of how the free rider’s surrounding affects him. It introduces the concepts of public and private harm from the free rider’s activity. It also describes a wide variety of manifestations of the “free ridership” in which the private harm suffered by significant social groups is large enough to cause on their part an active opposition to free riders. According to the authors, under proper institutional conditions this opposition results in effective decision of the “free rider problem”. They offer a mathematical model of the process: the Markov chain with a single or multiple absorbing states.

проблема безбилетникаобщественные благаобщий и частный вредмарковская цепьсаморегулирующаяся системаfree rider problempublic goodpublic and private harmMarkov chainselfadjusting systemReferencesАвтономов В. С. и др. (2004). 50 лекций по микроэкономике. СПб.: Экономическая школа. Т. 2.Avtonomov V. S. et al. (2004). 50 lectures on microeconomics. Vol. 2. St. Petersburg: Ekonomicheskaya Shkola. (In Russian).Гринберг Р. С., Рубинштейн А. Я. (2013). Индивидуум & государство: экономическая дилемма. М.: Весь мир.Grinberg R. S., Rubinstein A. Ya. (2013). Individual & state: Economic dilemma. Moscow: Ves Mir. (In Russian).Гринберг Р. С., Рубинштейн А. Я., Белоусова О. М., Нуреев Р. М. (2016). Экономика общественного сектора (новая теория): Учебник. М.: Инфра-М.Grinberg R. S., Rubinstein A. Ya., Belousova O. M., Nureev R. M. (2016). Economics of public sector (new theory): A textbook. Moscow: Infra-M. (In Russian).Кемени Дж., Снелл Дж. (1970). Конечные цепи Маркова. М.: Наука.Kemeny J., Snell J. (1970). Finite Markov chains. Moscow: Nauka. (In Russian).Олсон М. (1995). Логика коллективных действий: Общественные блага и теория групп. М.: ФЭИ. С. 240-241.Olson M. (1995). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Moscow: FEI, pp. 240—241. (In Russian).Пиндайк Р., Рубинфельд Д. (1992). Микроэкономика. М.: Экономика; Дело.Pindyck R., Rubinfeld D. (1992). Microeconomics. Moscow: Ekonomika; Delo. (In Russian).Пыркина О. Е., Юданов А. Ю. (2014). Модернизация экономики и проблема противодействия неоплаченному потреблению общественных благ // Экономика и управление в машиностроении. № 2. С. 18-23.Pyrkina O. E., Yudanov A. Yu. (2014). Counteraction against public benefits unpaid consumption in the light of economy modernization. Ekonomika i Upravlenie v Mashinostroenii, No. 2, pp. 18—23. (In Russian).Стиглиц Дж. Ю. (1997). Экономика государственного сектора. М.: Изд-во МГУ; Инфра-М.Stiglitz J. E. (1997). Economics of the public sector. Moscow: Izdatelstvo MGU; Infra-M. (In Russian).Уинтер С. Дж. (2001). Теория Коуза и проблемы компетентности и корпорации // Природа фирмы / Под ред. О. И. Уильямсона, С. Дж. Уинтера. М.: Дело. С. 268-294.Winter S. G. (2001). On Coase, competence, and the Corporation. In: O. E. Willamson, S. G. Winter (eds.). The nature of the firm. Moscow: Delo, pp. 268—294. (In Russian).Юданов А. Ю., Беккер Е. Г. (2008). Безбилетник или фальшивомонетчик? (Об одном решении неразрешимой проблемы) // Теневая экономика 2007: Научный ежегодник / Сост. Ю. В. Латов, под общ. ред. Л. М. Тимофеева. М.: РГГУ. С. 360-376.Yudanov A. Yu., Bekker E. G. (2008). Free rider or counterfeiter? (About a solution of unsolvable problem). In: Yu. V. Latov, L. M. Timofeev (eds.). Shadow economy—2007: Scientific Annual. Moscow: RGGU, pp. 360—376. (In Russian).Abásolo I., Tsuchiya A. (2012). Blood donation as a public good: An empirical investigation of the freerider problem. Sheffield Economic Research Paper Series (SERP), No. 2012004.Abásolo I., Tsuchiya A. (2012). Blood donation as a public good: An empirical investigation of the freerider problem. Sheffield Economic Research Paper Series (SERP), No. 2012004.Antinyan A., Corazzini L., Neururer D. (2015). Public good provision, punishment, and the endowment origin: Experimental evidence. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Vol. 56, No. C, pp. 72-77.Antinyan A., Corazzini L., Neururer D. (2015). Public good provision, punishment, and the endowment origin: Experimental evidence. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Vol. 56, No. C, pp. 72-77.Boadway R., Song Z., Tremblay J. (2007). Commitment and matching contributions to public goods. Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 91, No. 9, pp. 1664-1683.Boadway R., Song Z., Tremblay J. (2007). Commitment and matching contributions to public goods. Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 91, No. 9, pp. 1664-1683.Delaney J., Jacobson S. (2015). The good of the few: Reciprocal acts and the provision of a public bad. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Vol. 58, No. C, pp. 46-55.Delaney J., Jacobson S. (2015). The good of the few: Reciprocal acts and the provision of a public bad. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Vol. 58, No. C, pp. 46-55.Hampton J. (1987). Free-Rider problems in the production of collective goods. Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 245-273.Hampton J. (1987). Free-Rider problems in the production of collective goods. Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 245-273.Hardin R. (1971). Collective Action as an Agreeable n-Prisoner’s Dilemma. Behavioral Science, Vol. 16, No. 5, pp. 472-479.Hardin R. (1971). Collective Action as an Agreeable n-Prisoner’s Dilemma. Behavioral Science, Vol. 16, No. 5, pp. 472-479.Hardin R. (2013). The free rider problem. In: E. N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Online encyclopedia. URL http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ spr2013/entries/freerider/Hardin R. (2013). The free rider problem. In: E. N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Online encyclopedia. URL http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ spr2013/entries/freerider/He J. (2012). Counteracting freeriding with team morale - an experimental study. Project Management Journal, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 62-75.He J. (2012). Counteracting freeriding with team morale - an experimental study. Project Management Journal, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 62-75.Heckathorn D. D. (1996). The dynamics and dilemmas of collective action. American Sociological Review, Vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 250-277.Heckathorn D. D. (1996). The dynamics and dilemmas of collective action. American Sociological Review, Vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 250-277.Hogg T., Huberman B. A. (2008). Solving the organizational free riding problem with social network. AAAI Spring Symposium: Social Information Processing, pp. 24-29.Hogg T., Huberman B. A. (2008). Solving the organizational free riding problem with social network. AAAI Spring Symposium: Social Information Processing, pp. 24-29.Kahn D. A., Kahn J. H. (2011). Free rider: A justification for mandatory medical insurance under health care reform? Michigan Law Review First Impressions, Vol. 109, pp. 78-85.Kahn D. A., Kahn J. H. (2011). Free rider: A justification for mandatory medical insurance under health care reform? Michigan Law Review First Impressions, Vol. 109, pp. 78-85.Leeson P.T., Coyne C. J., Duncan T.K. (2014). A note on the market provision of national defense. Journal of Private Enterprise, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 51-55.Leeson P.T., Coyne C. J., Duncan T.K. (2014). A note on the market provision of national defense. Journal of Private Enterprise, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 51-55.Macy M. W. (1990). Learning theory and the logic of critical mass. American Sociological Review, Vol. 55, No. 6, pp. 809-826.Macy M. W. (1990). Learning theory and the logic of critical mass. American Sociological Review, Vol. 55, No. 6, pp. 809-826.Magnus J. R., Polterovich V. M., Danilov D. L., Savvateev A. V. (2002). Tolerance of cheating: An analysis across countries. Journal of Economic Education, Vol. 33, No. 2, рp. 125135.Magnus J. R., Polterovich V. M., Danilov D. L., Savvateev A. V. (2002). Tolerance of cheating: An analysis across countries. Journal of Economic Education, Vol. 33, No. 2, рp. 125135.Manzano G., Prado S. A. (2015). Liberalizing trade of environmental goods and services: How to address the freerider problem. Philippine Institute for Development Studies Policy Notes, No. 201511.Manzano G., Prado S. A. (2015). Liberalizing trade of environmental goods and services: How to address the freerider problem. Philippine Institute for Development Studies Policy Notes, No. 201511.More M. (1983). Private police and the free rider problem. Libertarian Alliance Political Notes, No. 17.More M. (1983). Private police and the free rider problem. Libertarian Alliance Political Notes, No. 17.Musgrave R. A., Musgrave P. B. (1989). Public finance in theory and practice. 5th ed. N. Y.: McGrawHill.Musgrave R. A., Musgrave P. B. (1989). Public finance in theory and practice. 5th ed. N. Y.: McGrawHill.Musgrave. R. A. (1959). The theory of public finance. N. Y.: McGrawHill.Musgrave. R. A. (1959). The theory of public finance. N. Y.: McGrawHill.Olson F., Cook M. L. (2006). The complexities of measuring free rider behavior: Preliminary musings. Presented at the ISNIE. Institutions: Economic, Political and Social Behavior, Boulder, Colorado.Olson F., Cook M. L. (2006). The complexities of measuring free rider behavior: Preliminary musings. Presented at the ISNIE. Institutions: Economic, Political and Social Behavior, Boulder, Colorado.Ostrom E. (2003). How types of goods and property rights jointly affect collective action. Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 239-270.Ostrom E. (2003). How types of goods and property rights jointly affect collective action. Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 239-270.Ostrom E., Gardner R., Walker J. (1994). Rules, games, and common-pool resources. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Ostrom E., Gardner R., Walker J. (1994). Rules, games, and common-pool resources. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Runge C. F. (1984). Institutions and the free rider: The assurance problem in collective action. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 154-181.Runge C. F. (1984). Institutions and the free rider: The assurance problem in collective action. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 154-181.Samuelson P.A. (1954). The pure theory of public expenditures. Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 387-389.Samuelson P.A. (1954). The pure theory of public expenditures. Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 387-389.Sandler T. (2013). Buchanan clubs. Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 265-284.Sandler T. (2013). Buchanan clubs. Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 265-284.Sanghavi S., Hajek B. (2005). A new mechanism for the freerider problem. SIGCOMM’05 Workshops, August 22-26, Philadelphia, USA, ACM 1595930264/05/0008, pp. 122-127. URL http://users.ece.utexas.edu/~sanghavi/p2pecon.pdf.Sanghavi S., Hajek B. (2005). A new mechanism for the freerider problem. SIGCOMM’05 Workshops, August 22-26, Philadelphia, USA, ACM 1595930264/05/0008, pp. 122-127. URL http://users.ece.utexas.edu/~sanghavi/p2pecon.pdf.Stroup R. L. (2000). Free riders and collective action revisited. Independent Review: A Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 485-500.Stroup R. L. (2000). Free riders and collective action revisited. Independent Review: A Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 485-500.Weismuller J. P. (2012). Social movements and free riders: Examining resource mobilization theory through the Bolivian Water War. Macalester Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, Article 4.Weismuller J. P. (2012). Social movements and free riders: Examining resource mobilization theory through the Bolivian Water War. Macalester Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, Article 4.

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.