voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2019-10-85-98voprecotest-2449Research ArticleДИСКУССИОННЫЙ КЛУБDEBATING SOCIETYБанк России и банковский надзор: вместе навек?Bank of Russia and bank supervision: Together forever?https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1448-1696БуклемишевО. В.BuklemishevOleg V.

Буклемишев Олег Витальевич, к. э. н., доцент кафедры макроэкономической политики и стратегического управления экономического факультета

Москва

Moscow

o.buklemishev@gmail.comhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-4335-7697ВатолинД. О.VatolinDmitriy O.

Ватолин Дмитрий Олегович, аспирант экономического факультета

Москва

Moscow

dimvatolin@gmail.comМГУ имени М. В. ЛомоносоваРоссияLomonosov Moscow State UniversityRussian Federation2019081020190108598Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20192019Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/2449

В статье обсуждается целесообразность институциональных изменений в российском банковском регулировании (надзоре). Описывается историческая и современная практика организации регуляторной деятельности на финансовых рынках. Рассмотрены и проанализированы в российских условиях традиционные теоретические аргументы в пользу совмещения центральным банком функций денежно-кредитной политики и банковского надзора, а также противоположные доводы. Последствия глобального финансового кризиса 2007—2009 гг. учитываются с точки зрения необходимости институционального оформления макропруденциальной политики и ее координации с микропруденциальной. Сделан вывод об отсутствии фундаментальных предпосылок для сохранения status quo при осуществлении банковского надзора Банком России в контексте значительных расходов на исправление его ошибок. Рекомендуется постепенно отказаться от сеньоражного финансирования банковского надзора.

The paper discusses the feasibility of institutional changes in the Russian banking regulation (supervision). The historical and modern practice of the organization of regulatory activity in financial markets is described. Traditional theoretical arguments in favor of and against combining the functions of monetary policy and banking supervision within the Bank of Russia are considered and analyzed under current conditions. The impact of the global financial crisis is taken into account in terms of the need to institutionalize macroprudential policies and to coordinate them with microprudential policies. Based on this analysis the conclusion is made about the absence of fundamental preconditions for preserving the status quo in relation to banking supervision by the Bank of Russia in the context of considerable costs of correcting its errors. There commendation to phase out seniorage financing of banking supervision is given.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.