voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2019-8-98-126voprecotest-2362Research ArticleДИСКУССИОННЫЙ КЛУБDEBATING SOCIETYContra панинституционализм. Часть IIContra pan-institutionalism. Part IIhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-2312-2110КапелюшниковР. И.KapeliushnikovRostislav I.

Капелюшников Ростислав Исаакович - член-корреспондент РАН, доктор экономических наук, главный научный сотрудник НИИМЭМО  имени Е. М. Примакова РАН, замдиректора ЦТИ НИУ ВШЭ.

Moscow

rostis@hse.ruНациональный исследовательский институт мировой экономики и международных отношений имени Е. М. Примакова, РАН; Центр трудовых исследований, Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»РоссияPrimakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, RAS ; Centre for Labour Market Studies, National Research University Higher School of EconomicsRussian Federation2019040820190898126Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20192019Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/2362

Работа посвящена критическому анализу панинституционализма — подхода, объясняющего ход мировой экономической истории изменениями в формальных экономических и политических институтах. Раскрываются методологическая узость, концептуальная противоречивость и историческая неадекватность панинституционалистского подхода. Во второй части статьи анализируются исторические идеи панинституционалистов и показывается, что их подход не способен объяснить ключевое событие мировой экономической истории — Промышленную революцию в Англии в середине XVIII в., то есть переход от мальтузианского к шумпетерианскому экономическому росту.

The paper provides a critical assessment of pan-institutionalism — an approach which tries to explain the course of the world economic history by changes in formal economic and formal political institutions. The paper demonstrates methodological narrowness, conceptual inconsistency and historical inadequacy of pan-institutionalism. The second part of the article analyzes the historical ideas of pan-institutionalists and shows that this approach fails to provide a coherent explanation of the turning point of the world economic history — the Industrial revolution in England in the mid of XVIII century, i.e. a transition from Malthusian to Schumpeterian economic growth.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.