voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2020-8-51-81voprecotest-2339Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORYОт трансакционных издержек – к трансакционной ценности: преодолевая фрикционную парадигмуFrom transaction costs to transaction value: Overcoming the frictional paradigmhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-7873-2725ФроловД. П.FrolovD. P.

Фролов Даниил Петрович, д. э. н., проф. кафедры экономики и предпринимательства

Daniil P. Frolov

Volgograd

ecodev@mail.ruВолгоградский государственный технический университетРоссияVolgograd State Technical UniversityRussian Federation202003082020085181Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20202020Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/2339

В области изучения трансакционных издержек существует немало догматических концепций и утверждений, сохранившихся под влиянием зависимости от предшествующего развития. К ним относятся догма о трансакцион ных издержках как трениях, догма о непродуктивности трансакций как генератора потерь, Стиглерова версия теоремы Коуза и логика минимизации трансакционных издержек, догма о приоритетности институтов обеспечения низкозатратных трансакций. Перечисленные догмы лежат в основе сложившейся традиции трансакционного анализа — фрикционной парадигмы, которая составляет фундамент неоинституциональной теории. Поэтому сообщество новых институционалистов имплицитно блокирует попытки серьезно пересмотреть эту догматику. В статье обоснована альтернативная доминирующему институциональному дискурсу ценностноориентированная перспектива развития трансакционных исследований на основе возвращения, переосмысления и объединения теорий трансакций Дж. Коммонса, трансакционного сектора Дж. Уоллиса — Д. Норта, трансакционных выгод Т. Сэндлера, Н. Комзы, Т. Эггертссона и трансакционной ценности Э. Заяца — Ц. Олсена. Приводятся аргументы в пользу более широких объяснительных возможностей ценностно-ориентированного трансакционного анализа.

The transaction cost economics has accumulated a mass of dogmatic concepts and assertions that have acquired high stability under the influence of path dependence. These include the dogma about transaction costs as frictions, the dogma about the unproductiveness of transactions as a generator of losses, “Stigler—Coase” theorem and the logic of transaction cost minimization, and also the dogma about the priority of institutions providing low-cost transactions. The listed dogmas underlie the prevailing tradition of transactional analysis the frictional paradigm — which, in turn, is the foundation of neo-institutional theory. Therefore, the community of new institutionalists implicitly blocks attempts of a serious revision of this dogmatics. The purpose of the article is to substantiate a post-institutional (alternative to the dominant neo-institutional discourse) value-oriented perspective for the development of transactional studies based on rethinking and combining forgotten theoretical alternatives. Those are Commons’s theory of transactions, Wallis—North’s theory of transaction sector, theory of transaction benefits (T. Sandler, N. Komesar, T. Eggertsson) and Zajac—Olsen’s theory of transaction value. The article provides arguments and examples in favor of broader explanatory possibilities of value-oriented transactional analysis.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.