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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">voprecotest</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вопросы экономики</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Voprosy Ekonomiki</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">0042-8736</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.32609/0042-8736-2019-7-119-146</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">voprecotest-2314</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ДИСКУССИОННЫЙ КЛУБ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>DEBATING SOCIETY</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Contra панинституционализм. Часть I</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Contra pan-institutionalism. Part I</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2312-2110</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Капелюшников</surname><given-names>Р. И.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Kapeliushnikov</surname><given-names>Rostislav I.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Капелюшников Ростислав Исаакович, чл.-корр. РАН, д. э. н., гл. н. с. ИМЭМО РАН, замдиректора Центра трудовых исследований НИУ ВШЭ</p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">rostis@hse.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Национальный исследовательский институт мировой экономики и международных отношений имени Е. М. Примакова РАН; Центр трудовых исследований Национального исследовательского университета «Высшая школа экономики»</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, RAS; Centre for Labour Market Studies, National Research University Higher School of Economics</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2019</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>03</day><month>07</month><year>2019</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>7</issue><fpage>119</fpage><lpage>146</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 2019</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2019</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><license xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/2314">https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/2314</self-uri><abstract><p>Работа посвящена критическому анализу панинституционализма — подхода, объясняющего ход мировой экономической истории изменениями в формальных экономических и формальных политических институтах. Этот подход монокаузален, так как для него формальные институты не просто «имеют значение»: де-факто, только они и имеют значение. Наиболее полные и развернутые версии панинституционализма были представлены в книгах, получивших широкую известность во всем мире, — «Насилие и социальные порядки» Д. Норта, Дж. Уоллиса и Б. Вайнгаста и «Почему одни страны богатые, а другие бедные» Д. Аджемоглу и Дж. Робинсона. Российское академическое сообщество восприняло их идеи как последнее слово современной экономической и политологической мысли. В работе ракрываются методологическая узость, концептуальная противоречивость и историческая неадекватность панинституционалистского подхода.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The paper provides a critical assessment of Pan-i nstitutionalism — an approach which tries to explain the course of the world economic history by changes in formal economic and formal political institutions. This approach is mono-causal since for it formal institutions do not simply matter: in fact they are all that matter. The most complete and elaborated versions of Pan-institutionalism were presented i n two famous books — “Violence and social order” by North, Wallis and Wei ngast and “Why nations fail” by Acemoglu and Robinson. Their ideas were taken by the Russian academic community as the last word in the modern economic and political sciences. The paper demonstrates methodological narrowness, conceptual inconsistency and historical inadequacy of Pan-institutionalism. In particular, it fails to provide a coherent explanation of the turning point of the world economic history — the Industrial revolution in England in the mid of XVIII century, i.e. a transition from Malthusian to Schumpeterian economic growth.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>институты</kwd><kwd>права собственности</kwd><kwd>экономический рост</kwd><kwd>Норт</kwd><kwd>Аджемоглу</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>institutions</kwd><kwd>property rights</kwd><kwd>economic growth</kwd><kwd>North</kwd><kwd>Acemoglu</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Аджемоглу Д., Робинсон Дж. А. (2016). Почему одни страны богатые, а другие бедные. М.: АСТ.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Acemoglu D., Robinson J. A. (2016). Why nations fail. Moscow: AST. 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