voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2020-3-28-45voprecotest-2217Research ArticleЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ПОЛИТИКАECONOMIC POLICYСильные стимулы и их возможная дисфункциональность в сфере государственного управленияHigh-powered incentives and their possible dysfunctionality in public administrationhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-2568-9097ДзагуроваН. Б.DzagurovaNataliya B.

Дзагурова Наталия Борисовна, к. э. н., доцент Департамента прикладной экономики факультета экономических наук НИУ ВШЭ

Москва

Moscow

ndzagourova@gmail.comhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-4487-7157АгамироваМ. Е.AgamirovaMaria E.

Агамирова Мария Евгеньевна, старший преподаватель Департамента прикладной экономики факультета экономических наук НИУ ВШЭ

Москва

Moscow

magamirova@gmail.comНациональный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»РоссияHSE UniversityRussian Federation202024022020032845Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20202020Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/2217

В статье обсуждаются неоднозначные результаты использования ключевых показателей эффективности (key performance indicator — KPI) в сфере государственного управления. Теоретические исследования последних десятилетий коренным образом изменили представления о желательности задания сильных стимулов. Стимулирующие воздействия чреваты негативными контрактными экстерналиями, сопряженными с ослаблением усилий агента по реализации слабо измеримых, соответственно не вознаграждаемых задач, а также с «работой на показатель». Особенно сомнительным представляется применение сильных стимулов в сфере государственного управления, поскольку функцией государства в современной научной литературе обычно считается не столько формирование сильных стимулов, сколько их ослабление.

                                                      

The article discusses the normative documents associated with the introduction of Russian regions’ heads key performance indicators (KPI). It draws attention to negative contract externalities intensively discussed in the economic literature of recent decades. Negative contract externalities accompanying the incentive contracts are typically associated with multitask moral hazard. They can serve as an explanation of KPI failure in many business firms. The results of KPI application in the sphere of public administration will inevitably become even more disappointing.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.