voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2016-7-106-122voprecotest-216Research ArticleМИРОВАЯ ЭКОНОМИКА И РОССИЯGLOBAL ECONOMY AND RUSSIAНеравные среди равных: почему развивающиеся страны реже выигрывают споры в ВТО?Unequal among equals: Why are developing countries less likely to win WTO disputes?КазунА. Д.KazunA.

преподаватель кафедры экономической социологии, м. н. с. Лаборатории экономико-социологических исследований НИУ ВШЭ (Москва)

adkazun@hse.ruКазунА. П.KazunA.

преподаватель департамента прикладной экономики, м. н. с. Международного центра изучения институтов и развития НИУ ВШЭ (Москва)

adkazun@hse.ruНИУ ВШЭРоссияNational Research University Higher School of EconomicsRussian Federation20162007201607106122Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20162016Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/216

В статье рассматриваются факторы, влияющие на шансы благоприятного разрешения исков в Органе по решению споров ВТО. На основе анализа нескольких сотен жалоб, поступивших в ВТО с момента создания торгового клуба по 2014 г., продемонстрировано, что у развивающихся стран меньше шансов на успешное разрешение спора в ВТО, чем у развитых. Указанные различия в шансах на позитивный исход дела можно объяснить на основе расхождений в размерах экономики стран (ВВП), однако в статье показано, что более адекватно объяснение на основе различий в опыте предыдущего участия стран в спорах ВТО.

This article discusses the factors that affect the chances of a favorable resolution of claims to the WTO dispute settlement. Drawing on several hundreds of complaints received by the WTO since the establishment of the organization and till 2014, we demonstrate that the developing countries have a smaller probability of successful resolution in the dispute than the developed countries. This inequality can be explained by differences in the size of economies (GDP), but the paper shows that differences in the country’s experience of participation in WTO disputes have a higher predictive power.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.