voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2019-2-81-96voprecotest-2144Research ArticleМАКРОЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯMACROECONOMIC RESEARCHВзаимосвязь коррупции и инфляции в условиях неоднородности коррупцииHeterogeneous corruption and inflationhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-5199-1639КавицкаяИ. Л.KavitskayaI. L.

Кавицкая Ирина Леонидовна, к. э. н., доцент департамента теоретической экономики, НИУ ВШЭ

Москва

Irina L. Kavitskaya

Moscow

ikavitskaya@hse.ruhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-7826-9072СафоновИ. Н.SafonovI. N.

Сафонов Игорь Николаевич, магистр, НИУ ВШЭ

Москва

Igor N. Safonov

Moscow

insafonov@edu.hse.ruНациональный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»РоссияNational Research University Higher School of EconomicsRussian Federation201907022019028196Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20192019Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/2144

В статье проанализировано одновременное влияние нескольких видов коррупции на инфляцию в условиях отсутствия сеньоража. На основе модели поведения центрального банка и правительства анализируется воздействие верхушечной и низовой коррупции на инфляцию через краткосрочную и долгосрочную реакцию экономики на дискреционную политику в условиях рационального поведения населения. Результаты, полученные в работе, позволили сделать вывод о том, что даже при отсутствии традиционного воздействия через сеньораж неоднородная коррупция оказывает влияние на инфляцию, причем различным образом в краткосрочном и долгосрочном периодах: в первом случае влияние оказывается прямым и «положительным», а во втором наряду с прямым положительным эффектом наблюдается косвенный эффект, который уменьшает равновесный уровень инфляции в долгосрочном периоде по сравнению с краткосрочным.

The article analyzes the simultaneous influence of different types of corruption on inflation in the absence of seignorage. Basing on the model of fiscal and monetary policymakers behavior, we analyze the joint impact of “grand” and “petty cash” corruption on economy in short and long term in discretionary policy and rational expectation assumptions. Research findings demonstrate that even in the absence of seignorage heterogeneous corruption relates to inflation differently in short and long term: in the first case, relationship is positive and straightforward, in the second, some indirect effects take place what reduces equilibrium inflation in the long run compared to the short run.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.