voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2004-12-131-140voprecotest-1980Research ArticleДИСКУССИОННЫЙ КЛУБDEBATING SOCIETYК вопросу о марксистской теории отношений труда и капитала: современный подходOn the Marxist View of Labor-Capital Relations: Modern ApproachРозановаН.RozanovaN.

доктор экономических наук, профессор

НазаренкоА.NazarenkoA.

студент Международного института экономики и финансов

ГУ-ВШЭРоссияState University - Higher School of EconomicsRussian Federation200420122004012131140Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20042004Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1980

Статья продолжает дискуссию о применимости марксистской теории в современных условиях. Авторы обращаются к марксовой теории отношений труда и капитала. К. Маркс обращал внимание только на один аспект таких отношений — конфликта труда и капитала, требующий революционного разрешения. По мнению ряда исследователей, отношения труда и капитала может моделироваться с помощью игровой ситуации "дилемма заключенного", при этом обе стороны могут придерживаться стратегии конфликта или сотрудничества. В рамках этой игровой модели рассматриваются различные результаты, при этом единственным Парето-эффективным исходом будет следование обеими сторонами стратегии сотрудничества.

Karl Marx saw only one aspect of the whole variety of relationships between labor and capital — the conflict leading to revolution. These relationships can be viewed as a game under the "prisoners' dilemma" situation where two main strategies of both parties are to conflict or to cooperate. Within this theoretical framework, different outcomes from partial and general equilibrium point of view are considered in the article. The cooperative outcome is treated as the only Pareto-efficient.

марксизмэкономическая теориятрудкапиталMarxismeconomic theorylaborcapitalReferencesГайдар Е., Мау В. Марксизм: между научной теорией и "светской религией" (либеральная апология) // Вопросы экономики, 2004, № 5, с. 4-27.Гайдар Е., Мау В. Марксизм: между научной теорией и "светской религией" (либеральная апология) // Вопросы экономики, 2004, № 5, с. 4-27.Гайдар Е., Мау В. Марксизм: между научной теорией и "светской религией" (либеральная апология) (Окончание) // Вопросы экономики, 2004, № 6, с. 28-56.Гайдар Е., Мау В. Марксизм: между научной теорией и "светской религией" (либеральная апология) (Окончание) // Вопросы экономики, 2004, № 6, с. 28-56.Amit R., Schoemaker P. Strategic Assets and Organizational Rent // Strategic Management Journal, 1993, vol. 14, No 1, p. 33-46.Amit R., Schoemaker P. Strategic Assets and Organizational Rent // Strategic Management Journal, 1993, vol. 14, No 1, p. 33-46.Barney J. Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage // Journal of Management, 1991, vol. 17, p. 99-120.Barney J. Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage // Journal of Management, 1991, vol. 17, p. 99-120.Becker G. Human Capital. New York: Columbia University Press for NBER, 1964.Becker G. Human Capital. New York: Columbia University Press for NBER, 1964.Brewster C. Towards a "European" Model of Human Resource Management // Journal of International Business Studies, 1995, vol. 26, No 1, p. 1-21.Brewster C. Towards a "European" Model of Human Resource Management // Journal of International Business Studies, 1995, vol. 26, No 1, p. 1-21.Briefs U. Co-determination in the Federal Republic of Germany. In: The State, Trade Unions and Self-Management: Issues of Competence and Control. Széll G., Blyton P., Cornforth C. (eds.). Berlin, New York: W. de Gruyter, 1989.Briefs U. Co-determination in the Federal Republic of Germany. In: The State, Trade Unions and Self-Management: Issues of Competence and Control. Széll G., Blyton P., Cornforth C. (eds.). Berlin, New York: W. de Gruyter, 1989.Coff R. Human Assets and Management Dilemmas // Academic Management Review, 1997, vol. 36, No 5, p. 1140-1157.Coff R. Human Assets and Management Dilemmas // Academic Management Review, 1997, vol. 36, No 5, p. 1140-1157.Edin P., Zetterberg J. Inter-industry Wage Differentials: Evidence from Sweden and a Comparison with the Unites States // American Economic Review, 1992, vol. 82, p. 1341-1349.Edin P., Zetterberg J. Inter-industry Wage Differentials: Evidence from Sweden and a Comparison with the Unites States // American Economic Review, 1992, vol. 82, p. 1341-1349.Galunic D., Anderson E. From Security to Mobility: Generalized Investments in Human Capital and Agent Commitment // Organization Science, 2000, vol. 11, No 1, p. 1-20Galunic D., Anderson E. From Security to Mobility: Generalized Investments in Human Capital and Agent Commitment // Organization Science, 2000, vol. 11, No 1, p. 1-20Kahn K. Collective Bargaining and the Inter-industry Wage Structure: International Evidence // Economica, 1998, vol. 65, No 260, p. 507-534.Kahn K. Collective Bargaining and the Inter-industry Wage Structure: International Evidence // Economica, 1998, vol. 65, No 260, p. 507-534.Katzenstein P. Small States in World Markets. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1985.Katzenstein P. Small States in World Markets. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1985.Krueger A., Summers L. Efficiency Wages and the Inter-industry Wage Structure // Econometrica, 1988, vol. 56, p. 259-293.Krueger A., Summers L. Efficiency Wages and the Inter-industry Wage Structure // Econometrica, 1988, vol. 56, p. 259-293.Labour Relations and Economic Performance. Brunetta R., dell’Aringa C. (eds.). L., Macmillan, 1990.Labour Relations and Economic Performance. Brunetta R., dell’Aringa C. (eds.). L., Macmillan, 1990.Lindbeck A., Snower D. Multitask Learning and the Reorganization of Work: from Tayloristic to Holistic Organization // Journal of Labor Economics, 2000, vol. 18, No 3, p. 353-376.Lindbeck A., Snower D. Multitask Learning and the Reorganization of Work: from Tayloristic to Holistic Organization // Journal of Labor Economics, 2000, vol. 18, No 3, p. 353-376.McNamara D. Corporatism and Cooperation among Japanese Labor // Comparative Politics, 1996, vol. 28, No 4, p. 379-397.McNamara D. Corporatism and Cooperation among Japanese Labor // Comparative Politics, 1996, vol. 28, No 4, p. 379-397.Morgenson G. Stock Options are not a Free Lunch // Forbes, 1998. May 18.Morgenson G. Stock Options are not a Free Lunch // Forbes, 1998. May 18.Ofek E., Yermack D. Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership // The Journal of Finance, 2000, vol. 55, No 3, p. 1367-1384.Ofek E., Yermack D. Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership // The Journal of Finance, 2000, vol. 55, No 3, p. 1367-1384.Osterloh M., Frey B. Motivation, Knowledge Transfer, and Organizational Forms // Organization Science. 2000, vol. 11, No 5, p. 538-550.Osterloh M., Frey B. Motivation, Knowledge Transfer, and Organizational Forms // Organization Science. 2000, vol. 11, No 5, p. 538-550.Pieper R. (ed.). Human Resource Management: an International Comparison. Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1990.Pieper R. (ed.). Human Resource Management: an International Comparison. Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1990.Porter M. Competitive Advantage. New York: Free Press, 1985.Porter M. Competitive Advantage. New York: Free Press, 1985.Rowthorn R. Centralisation, Employment and Wage Dispersion // Economic Journal, 1992, vol. 102, p. 506-523.Rowthorn R. Centralisation, Employment and Wage Dispersion // Economic Journal, 1992, vol. 102, p. 506-523.Sorensen A. Toward a Sounder Basis for Class Analysis // The American Journal of Sociology, 2000, vol. 105, No 6, p. 1523-1558.Sorensen A. Toward a Sounder Basis for Class Analysis // The American Journal of Sociology, 2000, vol. 105, No 6, p. 1523-1558.Teulings A. A Political Bargaining Theory of Co-Determination. In: The State, Trade Unions and Self-Management: Issues of Competence and Control. Széll G., Blyton P., Cornforth C. (eds.). Berlin, New York: W. de Gruyter, 1989.Teulings A. A Political Bargaining Theory of Co-Determination. In: The State, Trade Unions and Self-Management: Issues of Competence and Control. Széll G., Blyton P., Cornforth C. (eds.). Berlin, New York: W. de Gruyter, 1989.Wright E. Working Class Power, Capitalist Class Interests and Class Compromise // The American Journal of Sociology, 2000, vol. 105, No 4, p. 957-1002.Wright E. Working Class Power, Capitalist Class Interests and Class Compromise // The American Journal of Sociology, 2000, vol. 105, No 4, p. 957-1002.

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.