voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2004-12-35-53voprecotest-1975Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORYОсмысливая феномен мягких бюджетных ограничений (Окончание)Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint (The Ending)КорнаиЯ.KornaiJ.

профессор экономики

МаскинЭ.MaskinE.

профессор экономики

РоланЖ.RolandG.

профессор экономики

Гарвардский университет, Коллегиум БудапештВенгрияHarvard University; Collegium BudapestHungaryИнститут перспективных исследований; Принстонский университетСоединённые Штаты АмерикиInstitute for Advanced Study; Princeton UniversityUnited StatesКалифорнийский университет в БерклиСоединённые Штаты АмерикиUniversity of California, BerkeleyUnited States2004201220040123553Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20042004Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1975

Во второй части статьи анализируется феномен мягких бюджетных ограничений (МБО) в конкурентной среде. Рассматриваются его последствия для банков и роль в возникновении финансовых кризисов. Исследуется политическое вмешательство в деятельность фирм. Делается вывод о том, что синдром МБО может проявляться в любой экономической системе.

The phenomenon of the soft budget constraint (SBC) in a competitive environment is analyzed in the second part of the article. Its consequences for banks and the role played in developing financial crises are considered. Political intervention in firms is studied. The conclusion is made that the SBC syndrome can arise in any economic system.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.