voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2004-11-126-141voprecotest-1971Research ArticleБЮДЖЕТНО-НАЛОГОВАЯ ПОЛИТИКАFISCAL POLICYБюджетная децентрализация в странах с переходной экономикойFiscal Decentralization in Transition EconomiesЧернявскийА.ChernyavskyA.

кандидат экономических наук, руководитель проекта

ВартапетовК.VartapetovK.

докторант

Фонд "Институт экономики города"РоссияInstitute for Urban EconomicsRussian FederationОксфордский университетВеликобританияUniversity of OxfordUnited Kingdom200420112004011126141Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20042004Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1971

На основе методологии, разработанной ОЭСР, в статье проведена оценка степени децентрализации в сфере формирования бюджетных доходов в России в сравнении с другими европейскими странами с переходной экономикой. Проведен анализ теоретических аргументов, лежащих в основе процессов децентрализации, а также дана оценка структуры бюджетных доходов, уровня налоговой автономии, типов межбюджетных трансфертов. Представлена структура доходов территориальных бюджетов в зависимости от степени контроля региональных и местных органов власти за их формированием. На фоне значительных бюджетных полномочий субнациональных властей в странах Центральной и Восточной Европы уровень бюджетной децентрализации в России относительно низок. Как показывает анализ, развитие российских общественных финансов не происходит в направлении обеспечения фискальной автономии регионов и муниципалитетов.

By employing the methodology developed by the OECD the paper assesses the degree of revenue decentralization in Russia in comparison with other post-communist European countries. The paper provides theoretical arguments underpinning fiscal decentralization, analyzes the composition of subnational government revenues, the level of regional and local tax autonomy and types of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. The analysis presents the composition of revenues depending on the degree of subnational and local government control. In comparison with other transition countries fiscal decentralization in Russia is relatively low. It is concluded that Russia's public finance reform has not progressed towards providing greater fiscal autonomy for regional and local governments.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.