voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2004-8-4-35voprecotest-1925Research ArticleСОБСТВЕННОСТЬ И КОНТРОЛЬ В ЭКОНОМИКЕOWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN THE ECONOMYСобственность и контроль предприятийOwnership and Control of EnterprisesРюльК.RühlC.АнтимоноваО.AntimonovaO.ДребенцовВ.DrebentsovV.МорозовА.MorozovA.УлатовС.UlatovS.Всемирный банкСоединённые Штаты АмерикиThe World BankUnited States20042008200408435Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20042004Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1925

В работе анализируется степень концентрации собственности в российской экономике на основе специально созданной базы данных о собственности и контроле. Результаты исследования свидетельствуют о высокой концентрации собственности компаний, но ее отраслевое распределение неравномерно. Крупнейшие финансово-промышленные группы и их владельцы контролируют предприятия в ряде стратегических отраслей. В других отраслях концентрация собственности не столь высока. Компании, принадлежащие крупным российским собственникам, согласно нашим данным, не характеризуются более высокой эффективностью, чем принадлежащие другим частным собственникам. Региональные льготы чаще достаются фирмам, контролируемым региональными частными собственниками и иностранными инвесторами. Вместе с тем крупные бизнес-группы больше всех выигрывают при получении льгот на региональном уровне, что отрицательно сказывается на других предприятиях. Для борьбы с монополизмом важны институты, обеспечивающие соблюдение правил рыночной конкуренции на всех уровнях экономики. Вряд ли сейчас приемлемы любые попытки пересмотра итогов приватизации.

Ownership concentration in Russia's economy is analyzed in the given chapter of the World Bank Memorandum on the basis of the specially constructed database on ownership and control. The results of the study show high degree of ownership concentration in the Russian industry but it varies across sectors. The holdings of large owners with national significance are concentrated in some strategic sectors, while in other sectors ownership concentration is not so high. Our data reveals no evidence that the firms controlled by Russian large private owners are more productive then those of other private owners. Firms controlled by regional private owners and foreign investors are more likely to receive preferential treatment on the regional level but large business groups may reap more benefits from such treatment that negatively affects functioning of other enterprises. A rule-based system is necessary to safeguard competition on all levels of the economy. Nothing in our data provides an argument for re-nationalization in any shape or form.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.