voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2004-2-72-81voprecotest-1858Research Article"НОВАЯ ЭКОНОМИКА""NEW ECONOMY"Электронные рынки и конкуренцияE-Markets and CompetitionКузнецовА.KuznetsovA.

кандидат экономических наук, научный сотрудник

Институт финансовых исследованийРоссияInstitute for Financial StudiesRussian Federation200420022004027281Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20042004Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1858

Считается, что электронные рынки являются эффективными в терминах уровня цен, величины ценовой дисперсии, издержек меню и концентрации рыночных долей. Действительно, издержки меню и цены на электронных рынках существенно ниже чем на традиционных. Однако дисперсия цен и концентрация рыночных долей часто оказываются выше в Интернете. Можно предположить, что электронные рынки в силу их информационной прозрачности, небольшого числа продавцов, низких издержек меню создают прекрасные условия для неявного ценового сговора. Тот факт, что скорость реакции продавцов на действия одного из них выше, чем скорость реакции покупателей, обеспечивает возможность для повышения цен. Помимо этого обострение конкуренции между продавцами заставляет их дифференцироваться друг от друга путем рекламы. В стационарном равновесии увеличение числа покупателей может вести к вытеснению с рынка менее эффективных продавцов за счет опережающего роста затрат на рекламу.

Electronic markets are thought to be perfectly efficient in terms of price levels, price dispersion, menu costs and the number of competitive sellers in the market. Indeed, menu costs and prices are usually lower online, but some empirical studies have found that electronic markets are characterised by high price dispersion and high concentration of market power. The author suggests that because of low costs of searching and acquiring information, small number of sellers and low menu costs electronic markets provide better conditions for tacit collusion. The fact that sellers are able to react to competitors' actions faster than buyers may even foster prices to increase. Tighter online competition forces each seller to differentiate from others by advertising his own brand name. In a static equilibrium an increase of the number of buyers may lead to escalation of advertising expenses and force less efficient sellers out of the market.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.