voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2004-1-129-140voprecotest-1849Research ArticleКОРПОРАТИВНОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕCORPORATE GOVERNANCEКонвергенция моделей корпоративного управленияConvergence of Corporate Governance ModelsТретьяковМ.TretyakovM.

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ИМЭМО РАНРоссияInstitute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of SciencesRussian Federation20042001200401129140Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20042004Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1849

В статье анализируется процесс конвергенции аутсайдерской и инсайдерской моделей корпоративного управления. Рассматриваются характеристики базовых и промежуточных систем корпоративного управления, а также изменение роли основных агентов корпоративного управления. Главными факторами процесса конвергенции являются глобализация финансовых и товарных рынков, сближение правовых норм, открытый обмен идеями и информацией. Однако это не означает унификацию институциональной среды и национальных институтов корпоративного управления.

The article focuses on the analysis of the process of convergence of outsider and insider models of corporate governance. Chief characteristics of basic and intermediate systems of corporate governance as well as the changing role of its main agents are under examination. Globalization of financial and commodity markets, convergence of legal systems, an open exchange of ideas and information are the driving forces of the convergence of basic systems of corporate governance. However the convergence does not imply the unification of institutional environment and national institutions of corporate governance.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.