voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2006-1-50-69voprecotest-1695Research ArticleСОЦИАЛЬНО-ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЕ АСПЕКТЫ ВОЕННОЙ РЕФОРМЫSOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF MILITARY REFORMЭкономическое бремя призыва на военную службу в России: результаты микроэкономического анализаDistributional and Welfare Implications of the Military Draft in Russia: Micro-level EvidenceЕмцовР.YemtsovR.

кандидат экономических наук, старший экономист департамента Восточной Европы и Центральной Азии

 

ЛокшинМ.LokshinM.

доктор экономики, старший экономист департамента экономических исследований

 

Всемирный банкРоссияWorld BankRussian Federation200620012006015069Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20062006Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1695

В данной работе используются репрезентативные данные общенационального обследования НОБУС для анализа влияния призыва на военную службу на показатели распределения доходов и благосостояния. Предлагается теоретическая модель, описывающая процесс принятия членами домохозяйств решения о поступлении на военную службу. Для оценки влияния различных характеристик домохозяйств на вероятность призыва их членов на срочную военную службу и негативных последствий этого события для семейных доходов используются различные эконометрические методы. Полученные результаты свидетельствуют о том, что несоразмерно большая часть бремени воинской повинности ложится на бедные слои населения. У сыновей сельских жителей с низкими уровнями доходов и образования намного больше шансов быть призванными на военную службу, чем у сыновей городских жителей с высокими уровнями доходов и образования. Бедное население несет несоразмерно большие убытки, превышающие установленную законом ставку личного подоходного налога.

 

In this paper data from a large nationally representative survey in Russia are used to analyze the distributional and welfare implications of the military draft. The authors focus on draft avoidance as a common response to highly unpopular conscription system ridden by corruption. A theoretical model that describes household compliance decisions with respect to enlistment is developed. Several econometric techniques are employed to estimate the effect of household characteristics on the probability to serve in the army and the draft-induced implications for household income. The results indicate that the burden of conscription falls excessively on the poor. Poor, low-educated, rural households are much more likely to have their sons enlisted compared to urban, wealthy and better-educated families. The losses incurred by the poor are disproportionately large and exceed the statutory rate of personal income tax.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.