voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2006-1-22-38voprecotest-1693Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORYУлучшение защиты прав собственности - неиспользуемый резерв экономического роста России?Improvement of Property Rights Protection - Dormant Reserve of Russia’s Economic Growth?ТамбовцевВ.TambovtsevV.

доктор экономических наук, профессор экономического факультета

 

МГУ имени М. В. ЛомоносоваРоссияLomonosov Moscow State UniversityRussian Federation200620012006012238Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20062006Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1693

В статье анализируются основные положения экономической теории прав собственности, сквозь призму которых рассмотрены перспективы улучшения ситуации с защитой прав собственности в России. Подчеркивается важность независимости судебной системы, на уровень которой существенно влияет уровень политической конкуренции в стране. Исходя из растущего вклада в доходы государства поступлений, не связанных с созданием стоимости, делается вывод о наличии серьезных препятствий для улучшения защиты прав собственности и контрактных прав в России.

Prospects of the improvement of property rights protection in Russia are analyzed in the article through the prism of the economics of property rights. The level of independency of judiciary as a factor of property rights protection, and influence of the level of competition on the political market on judicial independency are stressed. Basing on the positive dynamics in Russia of the share of fiscal revenue that is not connected with value creation, the conclusion is drawn that there are great obstacles for improving the situation with property rights protection.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.