voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2006-1-4-21voprecotest-1692Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORYТомас Шеллинг, Роберт Ауман и теория интерактивных взаимодействий (Нобелевская премия 2005 г. по экономике)Thomas Schelling, Robert Aumann and Interactive Decision Theory (2005 Nobel Prize in Economics)БелянинА.BelyaninA.

доктор экономики, преподаватель МИЭФ ГУ-ВШЭ, научный сотрудник ИМЭМО РАН

 

ГУ-ВШЭ; ИМЭМО РАНРоссияState University - Higher School of Economics; Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of SciencesRussian Federation20062001200601421Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20062006Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1692

В статье рассмотрен вклад Т. Шеллинга и Р. Аумана - нобелевских лауреатов 2005 г. по экономике - в экономическую теорию и социальные науки в целом. Главные их научные достижения относятся к теории игр - мощному инструменту анализа взаимодействий индивидов и рационального поведения в широком контексте, от прикладной теории отраслевых рынков до экономики труда, социальной политики, международных отношений и политологии. Ауман и Шеллинг выступили первопроходцами в этой области, сформировав направление исследований, позволяющее расширить представления о рациональном поведении человека.

The paper describes the contributions of T. Schelling and R. J. Aumann, the Nobel Prize laureates of 2005 in economics, to modern economics and social sciences. Their key contributions were in the field of the game theory - a major tool to study human interactions and rational behavior in a wide variety of contexts, from applied industrial organization to labor economics, public policy, international relations and political science. Works by Aumann and Schelling were pathbreaking in this respect, and have paved the way to many modern developments that enhance our understanding of human rationality.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.