voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2007-4-4-24voprecotest-1587Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORYСвобода прессы, мотивация чиновников и «ресурсное проклятие»: теория и эмпирический анализMedia Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource CurseГуриевС.GurievS.

доктор экономических наук, ректор Российской экономической школы, директор ЦЭФИР

 

ЕгоровГ.EgorovG.

аспирант

 

СонинК.SoninK.

кандидат физико-математических наук, профессор Российской экономической школы, ведущий научный сотрудник ЦЭФИР

 

Российская экономическая школа; Центр экономических и финансовых исследований и разработокРоссияNew Economic School; Centre for Economic and Financial ResearchRussian FederationГарвардский университетРоссияHarvard UniversityRussian Federation20072004200704424Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20072007Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1587

Каким образом может авторитарный правитель обеспечить правильные стимулы для чиновников? В отсутствие конкурентных выборов и системы разделения властей правитель может черпать информацию либо от спецслужб, либо из средств массовой информации. Опасность использования первых состоит в том, что они могут вступить в сговор с коррумпированными чиновниками. Свободная пресса, добывая и распространяя информацию, ограничивает произвол бюрократии, однако она может также способствовать координации действий оппозиции против самого правителя. Авторы рассматривают динамическую модель, в которой правители выбирают степень независимости СМИ и создают контракты для бюрократов. Оказывается, что свобода прессы будет скорее ограничиваться в богатой ресурсами стране, в которой правитель в меньшей степени заинтересован в создании адекватных стимулов для бюрократов. В статье показано, что этот вывод хорошо согласуется с результатами эконометрического анализа панельных данных.

How can a non-democratic ruler provide proper incentives for state bureaucracy? In the absence of competitive elections and separation of powers, the ruler has to gather information either from a centralized agency such as a secret service or a decentralized source such as media. The danger of using a secret service is that it can collude with bureaucrats; overcoming collusion is costly. Free media aggregate information and thus constrain bureaucrats, but might also help citizens to coordinate on actions against the incumbent. We endogenize the ruler’s choice in a dynamic model to argue that free media are less likely to emerge in resource-rich economies, where the ruler is less interested in providing incentives to his subordinates. We show that this prediction is consistent with both cross-section and panel data.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.