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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">voprecotest</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вопросы экономики</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Voprosy Ekonomiki</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">0042-8736</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.32609/0042-8736-2007-1-33-44</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">voprecotest-1552</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЙ АНАЛИЗ КОРРУПЦИИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Исследование коррупции на основе методов экономической теории</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Application of Economic Methods to the Сorruption Research</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Епифанова</surname><given-names>Н.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Epifanova</surname><given-names>N.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>доцент кафедры экономической теории</p></bio><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Сибирская академия государственной службы</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Siberian Academy of Public Administration</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2007</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>20</day><month>01</month><year>2007</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>1</issue><fpage>33</fpage><lpage>44</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 2007</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2007</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><license xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1552">https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1552</self-uri><abstract><p>В статье проводится анализ экономических подходов к исследованию коррупции. Рассматриваются сущность и разновидности коррупции с точки зрения экономической теории, а также влияние коррупции на общественное благосостояние. Автор показывает, что однозначно выявить, какой эффект оказывает коррупция - позитивный или негативный, нельзя. В том случае если коррупция приводит к недопотреблению общественного блага по сравнению с ситуацией ее отсутствия, общество действительно теряет от ее появления. Однако коррупция может и увеличивать объем совокупного потребления, становясь тем самым «выгодной» для общества.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The paper addresses the analysis of economic approaches to the corruption research. Essence and different kinds of corruption are considered from the economic point of view as well as the impact of corruption on social welfare. The author shows that it is impossible to clarify, whether corruption has a positive or a negative effect, because it may both reduce and increase social welfare. If the corruption causes under-consumption of the public good as compared with the situation of its absence, then there is real social loss in the total consumption. But corruption may also increase the volume of total consumption, therefore increasing social welfare.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>коррупция</kwd><kwd>институциональная экономическая теория</kwd><kwd>рентоориентированное поведение</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>corruption</kwd><kwd>institutional economics</kwd><kwd>rent-seeking behaviour</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Тимофеев Л. М. Институциональная коррупция. М.: РГГУ, 2000.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Тимофеев Л. М. Институциональная коррупция. 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