voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2016-1-36-62voprecotest-155Research ArticleИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНЫЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯINSTITUTIONAL STUDIESНерешенный вопрос легитимности частной собственности в РоссииUnresolved issue of private property legitimacy in RussiaГригорьевЛ. М.GrigoryevL.

к. э. н., ординарный профессор, руководитель Департамента мировой экономики НИУ ВШЭ (Москва)

lgrigor1@yandex.ruКурдинА. А.KurdinA.

к. э. н., доцент Департамента мировой экономики НИУ ВШЭ, замзавкафедрой конкурентной и промышленной политики экономического факультета МГУ имени М. В. Ломоносова (Москва)

noemail@neicon.ruНИУ ВШЭРоссияNational Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia)Russian FederationНИУ ВШЭ; МГУ имени М. В. ЛомоносоваРоссияNational Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia); Lomonosov Moscow State University (Moscow, Russia)Russian Federation201620012016013662Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20162016Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/155

Институт частной собственности существует в России уже почти 25 лет, однако легитимность сложившихся за это время прав частной собственности, как и легитимность самого института, остается под сомнением. Несмотря на смену поколений и повышение жизненных стандартов, многие социологические замеры показывают, что большая часть населения России до сих пор негативно относится не только к приватизации 1990-х годов и ее итогам, но и к частной собственности как таковой. Оптимистические прогнозы относительно адаптации людей к новым реалиям не сбываются. Авторы анализируют причины и последствия нелегитимности прав частной собственности в настоящее время, сравнивают различные инструменты их легитимации и приходят к выводу о нецелесообразности дискреционного вмешательства в этот затянувшийся процесс и предпочтительности акцента на снижение неравенства и обеспечение функционирования формальных институтов без исключений и привилегий.

Private property exists in Russia for almost 25 years. However, the legitimacy of established property rights and the legitimacy of private property as an institution remain ambiguous. Despite the change of generations and the improvement of living standards, numerous opinion polls show that the majority of Russians refers negatively not only to the privatization of the 1990s and its results, but also to private property in general. Positive forecasts on the adaptation of people to new reality do not come true. The authors analyze the reasons and consequences of private property illegitimacy and compare alternative ways of its legitimating. The main conclusion is the uselessness of any discretionary state intervention in this long-lasting process, while the focus should be put on the mitigation of inequality and the enforcement of formal institutions without any exceptions or privileges.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.