voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2005-7-4-18voprecotest-1461Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORYИнституциональная теория бесконечного переделаInstitutional Theory of Endless RedistributionСонинК.SoninK.

кандидат физико-математических наук, профессор РЭШ/ЦЭФИР, сотрудник Института перспективных исследований (Принстон, США)

 

Российская экономическая школа; Центр экономических и финансовых исследований и разработок; Институт перспективных исследованийРоссияNew Economic School; Centre for Economic and Financial Research; Institute for Advanced StudyRussian Federation20052007200507418Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20052005Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1461

В статье анализируются проблемы трансформации экономических институтов на примере защиты прав собственности. Если этот институт несовершенен, то у экономических агентов возникают стимулы вкладывать средства в индивидуальную защиту прав собственности. С учетом экономии на масштабе наиболее богатые агенты получают значительное преимущество. Используя свои возможности, они могут отнимать (экспроприировать) собственность других агентов. Способность поддерживать систему индивидуальной защиты делает богатых агентов противниками централизованной (государственной) полной защиты прав собственности. Экономика может оказаться в плохом долгосрочном равновесии с низкими темпами экономического роста, сильным неравенством и бесконечным переделом собственности.

In unequal societies, the rich may benefit from shaping economic institutions in their favor. This paper analyzes the dynamics of institutional subversion by focusing on public protection of property rights. If this institution functions imperfectly, agents have incentives to invest in private protection of property rights. The ability to maintain private protection systems makes the rich natural opponents of public protection of property rights and precludes grass-roots demand to drive the development of the market-friendly institution. The economy becomes stuck in a bad equilibrium with low growth rates, high inequality of income, and wide-spread rent-seeking. The Russian oligarchs of the 1990s, who controlled large stakes of newly privatized property, provide motivation for this paper.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.