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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">voprecotest</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вопросы экономики</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Voprosy Ekonomiki</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">0042-8736</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.32609/0042-8736-2005-3-4-19</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">voprecotest-1414</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ НАУКА И ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>THE ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND EDUCATION</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Реформы российского образования и экономическая теория</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Economics and Reforms of Russia’s Education</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Тамбовцев</surname><given-names>В.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Tambovtsev</surname><given-names>V.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>доктор экономических наук, профессор экономического факультета</p><p> </p></bio><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>МГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Lomonosov Moscow State University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2005</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>20</day><month>03</month><year>2005</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>3</issue><fpage>4</fpage><lpage>19</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 2005</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2005</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><license xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1414">https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1414</self-uri><abstract><p>В статье сопоставляются основные направления изменений в экономическом механизме среднего образования в России, некоторые положения современной экономической теории, а также результаты анализа зарубежных реформ, нацеленных на усиление конкуренции между школами. Показано, что ожидания повышения качества отечественного среднего образования, связанные с изменениями в экономическом механизме, являются во многом ошибочными: и положения теории, и зарубежный опыт свидетельствуют о существовании серьезных рисков снижения качества образования как следствии усиления конкуренции между школами.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The directions of the change of economic mechanism of secondary education in Russia, some results of modern economics and the outcomes of school reforms in a number of foreign countries oriented at increasing competition among schools are considered in the paper. It is shown that expectations of better schooling quality due to economic mechanism change are to a large extent unsound: both theoretical arguments and international experience give evidence of serious risks that schooling quality will decrease as a result of competition among schools.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>образование</kwd><kwd>экономическая теория</kwd><kwd>реформы</kwd><kwd>конкуренция</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>education</kwd><kwd>economic theory</kwd><kwd>reforms</kwd><kwd>competition</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Акерлоф Дж. Рынок "лимонов": неопределенность качества и рыночный механизм // THESIS, 1994, № 5, с. 91-104.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Акерлоф Дж. 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