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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">voprecotest</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вопросы экономики</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Voprosy Ekonomiki</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">0042-8736</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.32609/0042-8736-2008-11-62-80</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">voprecotest-1370</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>МЕТОДОЛОГИЯ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОЙ НАУКИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>METODOLOGY OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Дилеммы экономиста-теоретика</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Рубинштейн</surname><given-names>Ар.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Rubinstein</surname><given-names>Ar.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>профессор экономической школы Университета Тель-Авива и экономического факультета Нью-Йоркского университета</p><p> </p></bio><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Университет Тель-Авива; Нью-Йоркский университет</institution><country>Израиль</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Tel Aviv University; New York University</institution><country>Israel</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2008</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>20</day><month>11</month><year>2008</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>11</issue><fpage>62</fpage><lpage>80</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 2008</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2008</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><license xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1370">https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1370</self-uri><abstract><p>В статье обсуждаются четыре дилеммы, с которыми сталкивается современный экономист-теоретик. Дилемма абсурдных выводов: следует ли отказаться от модели, если с ее помощью мы приходим к абсурдным результатам, или необходимо рассматривать ее как чрезвычайно ограниченный набор предпосылок, который в некоторых контекстах неизбежно будет неадекватным? Дилемма, связанная с учетом эмпирических данных: следует ли оценивать модели в соответствии с результатами экспериментальных исследований? Дилемма внетеоретических эмпирических взаимосвязей: должны ли модели содержать гипотезы для тестирования каких-то закономерностей или они представляют собой лишь логические упражнения, не играющие никакой роли в выявлении эмпирических взаимосвязей? Дилемма акутальности: имеют ли право экономисты консультировать кого-то или утверждать что-то с намерением повлиять на реальный мир?</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The paper discusses four dilemmas encountered by an economic theorist. The dilemma of absurd conclusions: should we abandon a model if it produces absurd conclusions or should we regard a model as a very limited set of assumptions that will inevitably fail in some contexts? The dilemma of responding to evidence: should our models be judged according to experimental results? The dilemma of modelless regularities: should models provide the hypothesis for testing or are they simply exercises in logic that have no use in identifying regularities? The dilemma of relevance: do economists have the right to offer advice or to make statements that are intended to influence the real world?</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>микроэкономическая теория</kwd><kwd>теория игр</kwd><kwd>гиперболическое дисконтирование</kwd><kwd>экспериментальная экономика</kwd><kwd>экономическая методология</kwd><kwd>экономическое образование</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>microeconomic theory</kwd><kwd>game theory</kwd><kwd>hyperbolic discounting</kwd><kwd>experimental economics</kwd><kwd>economic methodology</kwd><kwd>economic education</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Basu K. The Traveler's Dilemma: Paradoxes of Rationality in Game Theory // American Economic Review. 1994. No 84. P. 391-395.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Basu K. 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