voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2008-1-4-26voprecotest-1246Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORYТеория экономических механизмов (Нобелевская премия по экономике 2007 г.)Theory of Mechanism Design (2007 Nobel Prize in Economics)ИзмалковС.IzmalkovS.

профессор

СонинК.SoninK.

кандидат физико-математических наук, профессор

 

ЮдкевичМ.YudkevichM.Массачусетский технологический институтСоединённые Штаты АмерикиMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyUnited StatesРоссийская экономическая школа; Центр экономических и финансовых исследований и разработокРоссияNew Economic SchoolRussian FederationГУ-ВШЭРоссияState University - Higher School of EconomicsRussian Federation20082001200801426Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20082008Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1246

В статье дан обзор основных достижений теории экономических механизмов, вклад в развитие которой Лео Гурвица, Роджера Майерсона и Эрика Маскина был отмечен Нобелевской премией по экономике 2007 года. Рассматривается категориальный аппарат теории - понятия экономического механизма, совместимости стимулов, имплементации, а также логика ключевых результатов и возможности их применения для построения различных аукционных схем. В заключительной части работы описываются возможности применения теории экономических механизмов в современном институциональном анализе.

The paper outlines the basics of the mechanism design theory and describes the defining contribution of Leo Hurwiсz, Eric Maskin, and Roger Myerson, the Nobel prize winners in economics in 2007. It starts by introducing the concepts of economic mechanism, incentive compatibility, and implementation, and provides a non-technical description of main results. Then it explains the relationship between theoretical foundations and real-world market mechanisms such as auctions. Finally, recent applications of the mechanism design theory to institutional analysis are discussed.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.