voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2011-7-4-16voprecotest-1169Research ArticleИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНАЯ ТЕОРИЯ И СОВРЕМЕННЫЙ КАПИТАЛИЗМINSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND MODERN CAPITALISMЗнания и теория институциональных измененийKnowledge and the Theory of Institutional ChangeЭггертссонТ.EggertssonT.

профессор

Университет Исландии; Нью-Йоркский университетИсландияUniversity of Iceland; New York UniversityIceland20112007201107416Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20112011Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1169

Современная экономическая теория выделяет несколько источников экономического роста, такие как накопление капитала, новые технологии, права собственности, соблюдение контрактов, препятствующая извлечению ренты институциональная система. В данной статье рассматривается еще один источник - новые социальные технологии, и подчеркивается, что экономическая наука обладает недостаточным знанием социальных систем. Это затрудняет создание новых институтов. Автор предлагает новый подход к анализу институциональной политики. На примере современной биотехнологии показано, каким образом общественное мнение и конкурирующие точки зрения влияют на эволюцию прав собственности.

Modern theory identifies several sources of economic growth, such as capital accumulation, new technologies, secure property rights and contracts, and absence of rent seeking. This paper introduces new social technologies as yet another source of growth and emphasizes our incomplete knowledge of social system. It hinders the building of new institutions. The author introduces a framework for analyzing institutional policy and uses the case of modern biotechnologies to explain how uncertainty about social technologies, persuasion, and competing beliefs influence the evolution of property rights.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.