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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">voprecotest</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вопросы экономики</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Voprosy Ekonomiki</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">0042-8736</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.32609/0042-8736-2011-10-16-34</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">voprecotest-1138</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ISSUES OF THEORY</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Феномен «уклонения от двусмысленности» в теории рационального выбора</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Ambiguity Aversion Phenomenon and Rational Choice Theory</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Павлов</surname><given-names>И.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Pavlov</surname><given-names>I.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>кандидат экономических наук, преподаватель МГУ им. М. В. Ломоносова, старший научный сотрудник ИЭ РАН</p><p> </p></bio><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>МГУ имени М. В. Ломоносова; Институт экономики РАН</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Lomonosov Moscow State University; Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of Sciences</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2011</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>20</day><month>10</month><year>2011</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>10</issue><fpage>16</fpage><lpage>34</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 2011</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2011</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><license xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1138">https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1138</self-uri><abstract><p>Статья посвящена анализу одной из основных аномалий, наблюдаемых в индивидуальном поведении людей, совершающих выбор в ситуациях неопределенности, - уклонению от двусмысленности. Показано, что данное явление играет ключевую роль в современной теории рационального выбора и поэтому исследуется как экономистами-теоретиками, так и экспериментаторами. В статье дается подробный анализ сущности данного феномена и обсуждаются его наиболее вероятные причины.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The paper analyzes ambiguity aversion that is one of the main anomalies characteristic for the individual behaviour of economic agents making choice in the face of uncertainty. It shows that this phenomenon plays a major role in the contemporary rational choice theory and hence is widely discussed both by economic theorists and experimental economists. The article further elaborates on the nature of this phenomenon and considers its main causes.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>поведенческая экономика</kwd><kwd>теория рационального выбора</kwd><kwd>уклонение от двусмысленности</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>behavioral economics</kwd><kwd>rational choice theory</kwd><kwd>ambiguity aversion</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Найт Ф. Риск, неопределенность и прибыль. М.: Дело, 2003.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Найт Ф. Риск, неопределенность и прибыль. М.: Дело, 2003.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit2"><label>2</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Becker S., Brownson F. What Price Ambiguity? or the Role of Ambiguity in Decision-Making // Journal of Political Economy. 1964. Vol. 72, No 1. 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