voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2010-12-70-81voprecotest-1108Research ArticleДЕНЕЖНО-КРЕДИТНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА И ВЫЗОВЫ ТЕОРИИMONETARY POLICY AND CHALLENGES OF THEORYЦентральный банк как кредитор последней инстанции: новые вопросы теории денежно-кредитной политикиCentral Bank as a Lender of Last Resort: New Issues of the Monetary Policy TheoryАндрюшинС.AndryushinS.

доктор экономических наук, профессор Финансового университета, завсектором ИЭ РАН

КузнецоваВ.KuznetsovaV.

кандидат исторических наук, доцент МГУ, ведущий научный сотрудник ИЭ РАН

 

Финансовый университет при Правительстве Российской Федерации; Институт экономики РАНРоссияFinancial University under the Government of the Russian Federation; Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of SciencesRussian FederationМГУ имени М. В. Ломоносова; Институт экономики РАНРоссияLomonosov Moscow State University; Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of SciencesRussian Federation2010201220100127081Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20102010Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1108

В статье рассматривается проблема реализации центральным банком функции кредитора последней инстанции в условиях дефицита ликвидности. Показано, что классическое определение принципов кредитования последней инстанции перестало соответствовать задачам, решаемым центральным банком в условиях кризиса ликвидности.

The article considers the problem of realization of central banks function of the lender of last resort in the situation of liquidity deficit. It shows that the classic definition of the last resort credits principles is not adequate to the tasks which central banks have to solve during liquidity crisis.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.