voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2010-6-26-43voprecotest-1034Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORYРавновесие по Нэшу и история экономической наукиNash Equilibrium and the History of Economic TheoryМайерсонР.MyersonR.

профессор, лауреат Нобелевской премии в области экономики

 

Чикагский университетСоединённые Штаты АмерикиUniversity of ChicagoUnited States201020062010062643Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20102010Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/1034

Джон Нэш, создав некооперативную теорию игр, совершил один из важнейших прорывов в истории общественных наук. В статье работы Нэша в этой области анализируются и помещаются в исторический контекст, чтобы лучше понять, как развивались фундаментальные идеи некооперативной теории игр и как они изменили ход развития экономической теории. В частности, показывается, как изменился предмет экономической науки: от производства и распределения материальных благ - к исследованию рационального конкурентного поведения в рамках любого социального института.

John Nashs formulation of noncooperative game theory was one of the great breakthroughs in the history of social science. Nashs work in this area is reviewed in its historical context to better understand how the fundamental ideas of noncooperative game theory have been developed and how they have changed the course of economic theory. It is shown in particular how the scope of economics has changed from production and allocation of material goods to the study of rational competitive behavior in any institution of society.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.